





NYC AGAINST HATE VIOLENCE

**EVIDENCE-BASED
PREVENTION &
INFRASTRUCTURE
FOR INTERGROUP
COMMUNITY BUILDING**

**JEWS FOR RACIAL &
ECONOMIC JUSTICE**



NYC AGAINST HATE VIOLENCE: EVIDENCE-BASED PREVENTION & INFRASTRUCTURE FOR INTERGROUP COMMUNITY BUILDING

A Publication of Jews For Racial & Economic Justice

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
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INTRODUCTION

For almost a decade, hate violence has increased in New York City.

This increase has led to scores of tragic incidents including the murder of Arturo Jose Rodriguez-Marcano, neighbors that all too often live in fear of one another, and communities that cannot live freely, fully celebrating (*and being celebrated for*) their cultures, customs, and contributions to the unique tapestry that is New York City.¹ Even as crime in the city has fallen, with murders at record lows in January of 2026, hate crimes have only increased, up 152% compared to the same period in 2025.²



Over the past decade the NYPD Hate Crimes Task Force has been the city’s primary tool for fighting identity-based violence. On their watch, hate crimes have only increased, year after year. The number of incidents far exceeds the number of arrests, and the number of hate crimes convictions stands at a relative handful.

This should not come as a surprise. Researchers have shown repeatedly that hate crimes laws have no measurable deterrent effect. And when we are recording hate violence incidents in the thousands, arresting our way out of the problem is an unrealistic and naive approach to violence prevention.

By 2019 it was patently obvious that New York’s current strategy was not working. Jews For Racial & Economic Justice, the New York City Anti-Violence Project, and a coalition of organizations began advocating for community-based hate violence prevention. It was clear that this was a problem that could only be tackled by going after root causes, and that preventing violence before it occurred was far preferable to police running around the city effecting a handful of arrests every year once it was already too late for the victims, their families, and their communities. While we are proud of our success in winning a small investment in community-based

1 <https://www.thecity.nyc/2024/08/21/migrant-hate-crime-murder-charges-parks-worker-elijah-mitchell/>

2 [https://www.nyc.gov/site/nypd/news/PR002/nypd-fewest-shooting-incidents-shooting-victims-murders-january#:~:text=%E2%80%9CFfor%20the%20first%20month%20of,1%2C102\).](https://www.nyc.gov/site/nypd/news/PR002/nypd-fewest-shooting-incidents-shooting-victims-murders-january#:~:text=%E2%80%9CFfor%20the%20first%20month%20of,1%2C102).)

programs, it is clear that the city — under two mayoral administrations and two council speakers — was never truly serious about hate violence prevention.

However the blame is not entirely theirs. The situation New York faced is emblematic of a larger problem in the hate violence prevention field. There is almost no research into what actually works to prevent violence, leaving practitioners with little guidance on how to design programs that stand to make an impact. Without data, one can fairly question how New York City (and other municipalities) could resource these programs at a scale that could reasonably be expected to impact the situation in aggregate.

The goal of this report and its proposals is to address the lack of clarity about what actually works to prevent violence, and to, for the first time, consider the problem comprehensively as an endemic property of modern city life that can be addressed through policy. By examining the research that exists, and by creatively expanding the breadth of our search for relevant data, we find that we can present a strong foundation for policymaking that is practical and that conveniently comports with existing practice in the violence prevention field. To turn this research into recommendations we also engaged the community-based organizations that have been doing this work on the ground for years, local and national subject area experts, community leaders, academics, and national organizations. This report represents the collective knowledge of countless experts and practitioners here in New York, and around the world, all brought to bear on the city's crisis of identity-based violence.

We now have the research — we know what actually works. The question that remains to be answered is: will New York City finally take this problem seriously and provide the resources that communities need to begin building the durable safety infrastructure that will make this city a happier, healthier, safer home for all of its residents?

WHAT IS HATE VIOLENCE?

Hate violence is the term generally used to describe the broad category of events or actions that target an individual, group, location, or institution based on identity and other immutable characteristics in a manner that can include both acts categorized as crimes *as well as those that do not necessarily rise to the level of a crime*. For example, someone using racially derogatory language in an argument or distributing anti-gay pamphlets could be described as hate violence even though no law has been broken. The somewhat nebulous category of “hate speech” may or may not be included under the umbrella of hate violence depending on the context. For example, academic institutions or businesses may define “hate speech” and have internal regulations on language that are not applicable to city law or policies which should conform to the 1st Amendment’s broad protections for speech.

The narrower category of a *hate crime* is defined by the NYC Office for the Prevention of Hate Crimes as follows:

“A hate crime is a crime that is motivated in whole or substantial part by bias against certain personal characteristics. According to New York State law, there must be an underlying crime in order for an incident to be classified as a hate crime. That means authorities must first determine there was a crime committed. If it’s determined that the crime was motivated by bias, then hate crime charges may be added to the original charge.”³

It is worth noting that the terminology of “hate violence” is itself problematic — both the word “violence” and the word “hate.”

Not everything included under the term will be recognized as violent by all people, and differentiating between *physical* violence and something like chalking a swastika on the playground can leave one in linguistic knots. The term can potentially inadvertently minimize the experiences of survivors of physical assaults, while overemphasizing the impact of things like graffiti or casual, if hateful, speech. Finally, the term hate can fail to capture the systemic nature of the underlying bigotry. As analyst Chip Berlet notes, “organized supremacist groups utilize and amplify the same elements of prejudice, supremacy, demonization, and scapegoating that already exist in mainstream society. [Their] ideologies, styles, frames, and narratives...are drawn from pre-existing systems of oppression buried in mainstream society.”⁴ Therefore, as researcher and author Kay Whitlock points out, “If hate is a social problem, and not just a matter of individual psychology, then intensified policing and enhanced punishments cannot create safe and just communities.”⁵ The “hate frame” (Whitlock, Bronski) also fails to capture the intersectional nature of most hate violence.⁶ For example, an individual with a

3 <https://www.nyc.gov/assets/stophate/downloads/pdf/OPHC-WhatIsAHateCrime.pdf> (The definition continues: “These enhanced penalties exist because while any crime has a negative impact on the victim, hate crimes impact victims on a much deeper and emotional level, and the impact is wider — creating fear and community unrest with those who share the victim’s characteristics. There are many types of underlying crimes that, when combined with biased intent, can be considered hate crimes, including physical assault, verbal threats, robberies and burglaries, and property damage such as graffiti. New York law also specifically provides that anyone who places a swastika or noose — both historical expressions of hate — with the intent to harass, annoy, threaten, or alarm, can also be charged with aggravated harassment.”)

4 Berlet, Chip. (2004). Hate, Oppression, Repression, and the Apocalyptic Style: Facing Complex Questions and Challenges. *Journal of Hate Studies*. 3. 10.33972/jhs.27

5 Whitlock, Kay, *Reconsidering Hate*, Political Research Associates, 2012 <https://politicalresearch.org/sites/default/files/2018-10/HateFrames.pdf>

6 Beyerstein, L., *Beyond the Hate Frame*, The Public Eye, Political Research Associates, 2015; <https://politicalresearch.org/2015/07/27/beyond-hate-frame>

psychiatric disability may latch onto bigoted language they encounter in the media and consequently engage in an act of identity-based violence even though they themselves do not have a carefully developed or motivated dislike of the targeted ethnic group.

In general, legal criminal classifications and flattening terminology like “hate violence” often erases and fails to consider differential and contextualized power relations (e.g. of race, gender, sexuality, class, caste, disability, religion, migration status, housing status) between identity groups.

We will continue to use the term hate violence (along with “identity-based violence” and “bias incident”) throughout this paper as it is in common usage. In the future, using the power of New York City’s international example to promote or develop alternative language that better supports our goals may be worth pursuing.

What causes hate violence?

Like all categories of crime and violence in a society and a city as large and complex as ours, there is no single cause or predictive factor that explains hate violence. It is a complex interplay of forces at many levels of society from the lived personal experiences of an individual to the historical trauma and material conditions of a group, to the most abstract and conceptual aspects of power relations and hegemonic culture at a metasocial level.

Historical: Hate violence is generally predicated on a history of discrimination which will include all of the structural, cultural, and political elements below. An obvious example is antisemitism. Antisemitism emerged almost 2000 years ago in Europe at a time when European societies were dominated by Christianity. For the subsequent two millennia Jews constituted an “internal other” within Europe (while Muslims were the primary “external other”). The Enlightenment, rise of race science, and creation of the United States — a society organized around white supremacy — added different dimensions to the hierarchies ordering Western societies and the role of Jews within them. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, vicious anti-Jewish pogroms swept Europe as Jews were scapegoated for anti-monarchal and socialist movements that threatened existing elites, culminating in the Nazi Holocaust.⁷

In the U.S. today, antisemitism includes all of these historical elements but manifests largely as a conspiracy theory that blames Jews for structural failings and grievances in modern American society. A classic example is people experiencing housing instability focusing on the Jewishness of an exploitative landlord rather than social forces such as private equity and government disinvestment that have led to the scarcity of affordable housing. As we can see, antisemitism, like virtually all hate violence, contains elements of all of the categories below.

Structural: Structural drivers of hate violence include competition for resources, physical proximity between groups, legal factors including de jure discrimination, and intractable political factors (perceived or real inequities in political or economic power between groups). It can also include seemingly

⁷ Ferguson, L., Kent, D., Sharon, K.; Understanding Antisemitism, Jews For Racial & Economic Justice, 2017

mundane things like time of day, street lighting, and other environmental factors.⁸

Sociopolitical: This is often the most immediately obvious set of factors. It includes the contemporary political rhetoric by local and national leaders that one might encounter on the news, as well as messages, ideas, and imagery transmitted via film, television, and social media, and other forms of media, music, and popular entertainment. This can include major events (for example, a global pandemic) as well as the political response to it (such as President Trump assigning blame for the pandemic to China). This is supported by research from multiple sources which found that, “‘trigger events’ (for example, terror attacks) reliably lead to ‘spikes’ in racially and religiously motivated hate crime.”^{9,10,11,12,13}

Cultural, interpersonal & intercommunal: Finally, there is the specific interplay of geographically local or regional social group culture, real or perceived conflicts between ethnic or identity-based subcultures, and any other lessons an individual may have learned via their immediate family, friends, and social surroundings.

It is important to note that where enmity exists, it is as far as we are concerned, never “eternal,” “natural,” or inevitable — it is always learned, and situated in the contexts offered above. This is not to say that in-group bias is entirely avoidable, but fatalism about bigotry is neither helpful nor grounded in what we know about how humans relate to each other.

While it is often difficult to determine the *proximate* cause of a particular incident of hate violence, these causal factors are inevitably present. That said, it is possible to group motivations broadly. Using police data from offenders in Boston, researchers Jack McDevitt, Jack Levin, and Susan Bennett categorized hate crime offender motivations into four categories: thrill-seeking, defensive, retaliatory, and mission-driven, with thrill-seeking accounting for a substantial majority of cases.¹⁴

Thrill-seeking: According to McDevitt, et. al., “Although the underlying factor was bigotry, according to interviews with CDU investigators, the attack in these thrill-motivated cases was triggered by an immature desire to display power and to experience a rush at the expense of someone else... In a recent study, Byers et al. (1999) similarly reported that for most hate crime offenders, thrill seeking seemed to be a key motivation. Moreover, in a study focusing on antigay behavior among young adults, Franklin (2000) separates the two

8 “...analysis of charges for religiously aggravated offences in Scotland in 2017/18 (Scottish Government, 2018) found that peaks were typically recorded on weekday evenings with larger spikes at weekends, particularly on Saturday nights and the early hours of Sunday morning.” Hate crime: a thematic review of the current evidence, Olivia Hambly, Joanne Rixom, Shivani Singh and Tamsyn Wedlake-James, UK Home Office Research Report 102, October 2018

9 King, Ryan & SUTTON, GRETCHEN. (2013). High times for hate crimes: Explaining the temporal clustering of hate-motivated offending. *Criminology*. 51. 10.1111/1745-9125.12022.

10 Gareth, Cuerden & Rogers, C.. (2017). Exploring Race Hate Crime Reporting in Wales Following Brexit. *Review of European Studies*. 9. 158-158. 10.5539/res.v9n1p158.

11 O'Neill, A., Hate Crime, England and Wales, 2016/17; “The EU referendum campaign began on Friday 15 April 2016, with the result announced on Friday 24 June, the day after the referendum. Around this time there was a clear spike in hate crime (see Figure 2.2). As stated in the introduction, offences with a xenophobic element (such as graffiti targeting certain nationalities) can be recorded as race hate crimes by the police. Anecdotal evidence suggests that there was an increase in these types of offences around the time of the EU Referendum.”

12 Hanes, E., Machin, S., Hate Crime in the Wake of Terror Attacks: Evidence From 7/7 and 9/11, 2013.

13 Seay, M., Umamoto, K. & Ong, P. Fault Lines and Atmospheric Shifts: Understanding Temporal Spikes in Racially Motivated Hate Crimes in Los Angeles County. *Am J Crim Just* (2025). <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12103-025-09838-3>

14 McDevitt, J., Levin, J. and Bennett, S. (2002), Hate Crime Offenders: An Expanded Typology. *Journal of Social Issues*, 58: 303-317. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-4560.00262>

aspects of what we refer to as thrill motivation into two themes, peer dynamics and thrill seeking.”

Defensive: “Unlike thrill-motivated offenses, defensive bias attacks were committed, from the offender’s prejudiced point of view, in order to protect his neighborhood from those he considered to be outsiders or intruders. In interviews with police investigators and in several police reports, offenders expressed their belief that members of another group, whether Black, Latino, or Asian, had undeservedly moved into a home on their previously all-White block. According to these reports, the objective of these crimes was to convince the outsider to relocate elsewhere and also to send a message to other members of the victim’s group that they too were not welcome in the neighborhood. Previous research has suggested that hate crimes are associated with demographic shifts at the neighborhood level.” (McDevitt, et. al. 2002)

Retaliatory: “In discussing retaliatory offenses, we refer specifically to incidents in which offenders act in response to a hate crime, whether real or perceived... Attacks based on revenge tend to have the greatest potential for fueling and refueling additional hate offenses. For example, a recent hate-related killing spree committed by a Black resident of suburban Pittsburgh most likely triggered a retaliatory rampage perpetrated by a White resident of the same area just weeks later.” (McDevitt, et. al. 2002)

These events can be the result of national or even international incidents, such as the wave of anti-Arab, Muslim, Sikh, and Hindu violence following the 9/11 attacks, or the murder of Wadea al-Fayoume in response to the 2023 October 7th attacks in Israel and the war on Gaza.

Mission-driven: “In so-called mission hate crimes, the perpetrator seeks to rid the world of evil rather than to respond to any specific event that threatens him. He may join an organized hate group, such as the Ku Klux Klan or the National Alliance, or he may operate alone, as did Timothy McVeigh, the convicted murderer of 168 Americans in the bombing of the Murrow *[sic]* Federal Building in Oklahoma City. He makes hate a career rather than a hobby.” (McDevitt, et. al. 2002)

Table 1. Frequency of Offender Motivation in Boston Police Department Cases, 1991–1992

Offender motivation	Number of cases	Percentage of cases
Thrill	111	66%
Defensive	43	25%
Retaliatory	14	8%
Mission	1	<1%
Total	169	100%

This taxonomy is a very useful starting point. However it fails to capture some key features of the offender population. First and foremost, each category is monocausal. It is entirely possible for multiple motivations to overlap. In addition, it doesn’t account for the role that co-occurring criminogenic risk factors like mental illness, substance use disorder, and recreational drug and alcohol usage play. In a study of hate crimes in Scotland in 2016–2017 approximately half of all accused offenders were described as being under the influence of alcohol and 10% were suspected of being under the

Reproduced from: Hate Crime Offenders: An Expanded Typology; J. Mcdevitt, J. Levin, Stephanie Bennett

influence of drugs.¹⁵ And lastly it does not necessarily include behaviors specific to hate *violence* rather than hate *crimes*. For example, a category like thrill seeking doesn't seem to fully characterize a very young person who draws a swastika on a school playground without fully understanding the meaning of the symbol.

In addition, key factors not captured by the studies previously mentioned are opportunity and power. Looking at patterns of anti-Arab and anti-Muslim hate crimes after 9/11, Ilir Disha, James Cavendish and Ryan King found that cities with larger Arab/Muslim populations had higher incidences of hate crimes.¹⁶ While this may seem intuitive, it must be understood in the context of power and vulnerability:

“Once the Arab or Muslim populations were taken into account as offsets, the results indicated that Arabs and Muslims were at higher risk of victimization after 9/11 in counties where their proportions were extremely small, and Table 5 [reproduced below] indicated that this was particularly the case when the majority group (whites) represented a very large proportion of the population. In such contexts, the small minority group is visible, has little protection, and is thus highly vulnerable. We see this finding as aligning with a power-differential hypothesis. As Levine and Campbell (1972) might have argued, large proportions of minorities may not be an indication of threat but of power to mobilize and retaliate against discrimination and hostility. We would add that this is especially the case for very small minority groups.”¹⁷

Table 5 • Negative Binomial Estimates of Anti-Arab/Muslim Hate Crime Incidents in U.S. Counties with Nonzero Arab or Nonzero Muslim Population before and after September 11, 2001 (with Respective Population Sizes as Offsets)

<i>Independent Variables</i>	<i>Anti-Arab/Muslim Hate Crimes before September 11</i>		<i>Anti-Arab/Muslim Hate Crimes after September 11</i>	
	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4</i>
Percent white in 2000	.02 (.01)	.02* (.01)	.02*** (.01)	.03*** (.01)
Percent Arab in 2000	.32 (.93)	—	.81 (.57)	—
Percent Muslim in 2000	—	.48 (.40)	—	.21 (.24)
Percent Arab*percent white	-.02 (.01)	—	-.03*** (.01)	—
Percent Muslim*percent white	—	-.03** (.01)	—	-.02*** (.004)
<i>N</i> = 2,343 in Models 1 and 3				
<i>N</i> = 422 in Models 2 and 4				

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Only the interaction terms and their component variables are shown in the table, although all models control for all variables included in previous tables (except for the quadratic terms for percent Muslim and percent Arab). Data for these analyses are restricted to the 8½ months before and 8½ months after September 11th, 2001. All models include population offsets (logged number of Arabs in Models 1 and 3; logged number of Muslims in Models 2 and 4).

p* < .05 *p* < .01 ****p* < .001 (two-tailed tests)

Reproduced from: Ilir Disha, James C. Cavendish, Ryan D. King - Historical Events and Spaces of Hate

There are various theories regarding the spatial clustering of hate crimes, which point to factors like resource competition (Blalock, 1967), social disorder (Sampson, Raudenbush, & Earls, 1997; Shaw & McKay, 1969), and the aforementioned defensive response to perceived threat (Buell, 1980; Grattet, 2009; Green, Strolovitch, & Wong, 1998). We believe the question remains underdetermined, with no reliable

15 Hambly, O., Rixom, J., Singh, S., Wedlake-James, T. “Hate crime: a thematic review of the current evidence.” UK Home Office Research Report 102; October 2018.

16 Disha, Ilir, et al. “Historical Events and Spaces of Hate: Hate Crimes against Arabs and Muslims in Post-9/11 America.” *Social Problems*, vol. 58, no. 1, 2011, pp. 21–46. JSTOR, <https://doi.org/10.1525/sp.2011.58.1.21>.

17 Disha, Ilir, et al. “Historical Events and Spaces of Hate: Hate Crimes against Arabs and Muslims in Post-9/11 America.” *Social Problems*, vol. 58, no. 1, 2011, pp. 21–46. JSTOR, <https://doi.org/10.1525/sp.2011.58.1.21>.

way to differentiate between the predictive accuracy of these theories. However the research is clear that households that speak a language other than English are at higher risk, as are renters (as opposed to homeowners).¹⁸ In addition, as researcher Kathryn Benier notes, “The estimated percentage of hate crimes that occur near a victim’s home ranges from 70% to 90% of all hate crime offenses in the United States and United Kingdom (Harlow, 2005; Mason, 2005; Roberts, Innes, Williams, Tregidga, & Gadd, 2013). Indeed McDevitt and colleagues (2001) note that hate crimes are more likely to occur in the immediate vicinity to one’s house than nonhate offenses.”¹⁹

Many of the factors listed above, from the historical to the question of power and vulnerability, help to explain why anti-Black hate violence remains the most prevalent form of hate violence in the United States. As of 2024 African-Americans made up 51.3% of reported hate crime victims, a percentage three times greater than the next racial or ethnic category.²⁰

It is also important to note that hate violence perpetrators act on their perception of a targeted person’s identity. This has led to any number of tragic “mistaken identity” cases. The Sikh and Hindu communities in particular have been the target of awful attacks intended, by confused racists, for other communities (as was the case in the murder of Balbir Singh Sodhi in 2003, and was likely the case in the Oak Creek gurdwara attack in 2012).^{21,22}

What is the current state of hate violence prevention in New York City?

In 2019, JFREJ, the New York City Anti-Violence Project, and our partners in the [NYC Against Hate Coalition](#) fought for and won approximately \$1.7 million dollars in FY20 new initiative funding ([Hate Violence Prevention Initiative](#) or HVPI, later the Hate Crimes Initiative) from the City Council in response to rapidly rising hate crime rates in New York City. This initiative provides resources to community-based organizations to engage in culturally-competent hate violence prevention and education. This allocation coincided with the establishment of the Office for the Prevention of Hate Crimes in the Mayor’s Office of Criminal Justice.

In the years following, that already low-level of funding [was](#) cut [repeatedly](#), despite skyrocketing levels of identity-based violence directed at Jewish, Asian, and LGBTQ New Yorkers and ongoing unacceptable bigotry directed at Black, immigrant, Arab, Muslim, Sikh, and many other communities throughout our city. Meanwhile we saw the terrifying rise in anti-Asian hate violence during the early phase of the COVID-19 pandemic. The Asian American Federation (an NYC Against Hate member organization) led the Hope Against Hate Campaign in response to the brutal wave of anti-AAPI violence then rocking New York City. We campaigned to

18 Benier, K. (2017). The Neighborhood Context of Hate Crime: A Comparison of Violent and Property Offenses Using Rare Events Modeling. *Violence and Victims*, 32(4), 584–608. <https://doi.org/10.1891/0886-6708.32.4.584>

19 Benier K. The Neighborhood Context of Hate Crime: A Comparison of Violent and Property Offenses Using Rare Events Modeling. *Violence Vict.* 2017 Aug 1;32(4):584-608. doi: 10.1891/0886-6708.VV-D-16-00117. Epub 2017 May 17. PMID: 28516832.

20 2023 FBI Hate Crimes Statistics Report; <https://www.justice.gov/crs/news/2023-hate-crime-statistics#:~:text=Increase%20in%20Hate%20Crimes:%20The,highest%20racial%20or%20ethnic%20category.>

21 <https://www.sikhcoalition.org/blog/2025/take-action-combat-hate-violence-and-honor-balbir-singh-sodhi-ji/>

22 Dawinder, S., “Mistaken Identity: The True Scope of Islamophobia,” Lawfare; <https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/mistaken-identity-true-scope-islamophobia>

fund the program via allocations to the AAPI Community Support Initiative, led by the Coalition for Asian American Children and Families (CACF).

In 2021 the Mayor's Office funded a new \$2.4 million dollar initiative, [PATH Forward](#), gratifyingly modeled on NYC Against Hate. PATH Forward provides a cohort of community-based anchor organizations funding to regrant to other organizations representing directly impacted communities throughout the city. While this funding stream via the Mayor's Office is more secure than the unpredictable yearly allocation via the city council, truly effective hate violence prevention at the community level remains wildly under-resourced in a city of 8.5 million people and is not a serious response to the terrible problem we face.

What is problematic about police response, armed guards & prosecution?

The city's underinvestment in community-based prevention is especially clear when compared with the city's spending on the NYPD's Hate Crimes Taskforce. The city has poured resources into the taskforce and focused on prosecutions — sometimes [arresting children](#) as young as 13 or 14.²³ It should be obvious that chasing down random individuals after the crime has already been committed and arresting children is simply not an effective or just approach to preventing violence before it occurs.

In 2022, for example, the taskforce only made arrests in approximately 50% of cases.²⁴ But based on 2022 reporting by [The City](#), only 15% of that 50% even resulted in a hate crimes conviction — just 87 people over 5 years.²⁵ This is representative of hate crimes prosecutions nationally. According to detailed research by Lisa M. Jones, Kimberly J. Mitchell, and Heather A. Turner in 2022, “only 4% of hate crime investigations lead to a suspect being charged with hate crimes. In over a third of cases, no suspect is identified by police, and in another third, there is no arrest.”²⁶

Of great concern are the most terrifying circumstances — that of the avowed white nationalist or other identity-based extremist attacking a house of worship or cultural center. A common solution involves grants for armed guards or stationing NYPD outside of places of worship. There is real danger that we cannot and should not ignore, and there are instances where heroic armed individuals have saved lives. But unless we are dealing with root causes, we are simply allowing many communities to live in a state of perpetual fear, while offloading rare, but extreme danger onto a tiny group of usually poorly paid hired guards or other first responders. That is not a responsible course of action.

Moreover, there is also concern that stationing armed guards or police at sensitive sites may [actually attract shooters](#) rather than deter them.²⁷ Criminologist Adam

23 <https://www.dnainfo.com/new-york/20151215/yorkville/14-year-old-charged-with-hate-crime-vandalism-of-ues-menorah-nypd/#:~:text=The%20teen%2C%20whom%20the%20NYPD,city%20around%2C%22%20Weinstock%20continued.%;https://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/14-year-old-charged-with-hate-crime-after-spraying-2-men-with-fire-extinguishers-nypd/3843510/>

24 NYPD, Complaints and Arrests Summary, Annual 2022; <https://www.nyc.gov/assets/nypd/downloads/excel/hate-crimes/2022/hate-crime-complaints-arrests-summary-annual-2022.xlsx>

25 <https://www.thecity.nyc/2022/03/06/hate-crime-nyc-dropped-before-conviction/>

26 U.S. Hate Crime Investigation Rates and Characteristics: Findings from the National Hate Crime Investigations Study (NHCIS) Author(s): Lisa M. Jones, Ph.D., Kimberly J. Mitchell, Ph.D., Heather A. Turner, Ph.D., 2022

27 Christopher Ingraham, “For many mass shooters, armed guards aren’t a deterrent, they’re part of the fantasy,” *Washington Post*, 2018, (<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2018/03/01/for-many-mass-shooters-armed-guards-arent-a-deterrent-theyre-part-of-the-fantasy/>)

Lankford told the Washington Post, “Because many offenders are suicidal and expect to be shot and killed, they wouldn’t be deterred by places with armed guards or gun-toting citizens.” For many, a confrontation with an armed defender may be part of the attraction. For these reasons we do not believe that placing armed officers outside every place of worship is a sustainable strategy, especially given that it can alienate community members, suggest favoritism on the part of an administration, and increase over-policing of vulnerable populations. If the city fails to invest in long-term prevention strategies, New York City’s status quo will require vulnerable communities to pray under the protection of armed guards in perpetuity. Surely we can do better.

Finally, it should be obvious that police are a very poor vehicle for engaging communities around hate violence prevention. In fact the NYPD have historically been a key institutional perpetrator of identity-based violence. For example, as detailed by Brooklyn Defender Services:

“In 2014, the NYPD amended its Patrol Guide to expressly prohibit speech or conduct targeting a person’s actual or perceived protected status and implemented a process for investigating complaints of biased behavior by members of the Department. The NYPD had not previously tracked these complaints or had a specific process for investigating them, and this move was widely considered as a necessary reform. Over the next five years, about 2,500 of these complaints had been made by the public. Then, in 2019, a watchdog report by the Department of Investigation called out the NYPD for failing to substantiate any of these claims and for deficiencies in the investigatory process. In an unbelievable demonstration of the ineffectiveness of such police “reforms,” as of December 2020 only one allegation of bias has been substantiated — against a school safety officer.”²⁸

In addition, a 2017 investigation by the New York City Department of Investigation (DOI) found that some NYPD officers reportedly used slurs related to gender identity and sexual orientation, refused to take crime reports from transgender and gender non-conforming (TGNC) individuals, and that TGNC people of color in particular reported profiling during stops targeting sex workers.²⁹

At the best of times, many of the communities most impacted by hate violence do not trust the NYPD and will refrain from interacting with them for any number of reasons. That reality is even more acute today, with ICE raids terrorizing communities across America and the Supreme Court’s “Kavanaugh stops” authorizing police racial profiling.

A 2021 report by Stanford Law School and the Brennan Center for Justice sums up the situation succinctly:

“The traditional hate crimes legal model often falls short in achieving its goals of expressing condemnation for hate crimes and deterring future hate crimes. Significant community mistrust of police contributes to the underreporting of hate crimes to law enforcement, while additional challenges limit the investigation and charging of hate crimes that are reported. Further, while one would assume that hate crimes enforcement would protect people of color and other marginalized

28 <https://bds.org/latest/bds-testimony-before-new-york-city-council-committee-on-oversight-and-investigations-and-committee-on-public-safety-regarding-racism-bias-and-hate-speech-in-the-nypd>

29 https://www.nyc.gov/assets/doi/press-releases/2017/nov/31_LGBTQ_ReportRelease_112117.pdf

groups—as many advocates for hate crimes laws envisioned—hate crimes charges also penalize members of these marginalized communities as defendants.”³⁰

What are the problems with reporting?

There is universal agreement that hate violence reporting is hopelessly unreliable. In their 2020 annual report, OPHC says “hate crimes are vastly under-reported for a number of reasons, particularly in communities that have not developed a high trust relationship with law enforcement.”³¹ And that is just for hate *crimes*, not hate violence.

The reasons for under-reporting are varied. They include uneven police data collection, mischaracterization of incidents (a common frustration for many communities), and widespread public distrust of the NYPD. Data collection is also compromised because, absent clarifying evidence, hate crimes are classified by the NYPD Hate Crimes Task Force and by the Office for the Prevention of Hate Crimes by the perpetrator's *perception* of the victim's identity, as opposed to the victim's actual identity.

A prominent study by Frank Pezzella and colleagues found that between 2004–2012, there was an average of around 269,000 self-reported bias victimizations annually, whereas the FBI's official Uniform Crime Report (UCR) recorded an average of only approximately 8,770 police-reported hate-crime incidents per year.³² Meanwhile a survey of U.S. Muslims found that 55.4% of respondents who had experienced what they viewed as Islamophobic incidents did not report them to authorities and many said they wouldn't know where to report incidents even if they wanted to.³³ Consider this finding in the context of the NYPD's [illegal and pervasive surveillance of Muslim communities](#) after 9/11 and it is not hard to understand why bias incidents might go underreported.³⁴

Similarly, LGBTQ New Yorkers are less likely to report incidents. One possible reason is that police are all-too-often themselves perpetrators of anti-LGBTQ hate violence. In addition to the 2017 DOI report that found NYPD officers using anti-LGBTQ slurs and refusing to take hate crime reports from TGNC New Yorkers, a 2012 report by Make The Road NY (an NYC Against Hate member organization) found that LGBTQ youth in NYC were significantly more likely than their non-LGBTQ peers to report negative interactions—including harassment and sexual misconduct—with police.³⁵

This finding is reflected in a 2025 Community Safety Project report which found that “13% [of] LGBQ+ survey participants reported feeling targeted by the NYPD because of their sexual orientation, and 9% experienced harassment based on sexual orientation, including police making insulting comments about their sexuality.”

30 https://law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Alternative-to-Hate-Crimes-Report_v09-final.pdf

31 <https://criminaljustice.cityofnewyork.us/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/2020-OPHC-Annual-Report.pdf>

32 Pezzella, F. (2019). The Dark Figure of Hate Crime Underreporting. American Behavioral Scientist. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764218823844>

33 The Pervasiveness of Islamophobia in the United States: Shadow Report to the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. Basima Sisemore & Elsadig Elsheikh, 2022; <https://belonging.berkeley.edu/pervasiveness-islamophobia-united-states>

34 Hassan v. City of New York 2:12-cv-03401, U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey; Raza v. City of New York 1:13-cv-03448, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York

35 https://maketheroadny.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/MRNY_Transgressive_Policing_Full_Report_10.23.12B.pdf

The report further details harassment of trans and gender non-conforming individuals: “Many transgender and non-binary participants also experienced police harassment, including 26% (n=15) of the survey respondents who reported experiencing gender-based harassment from the NYPD, and 43% (n=26) who felt targeted by the NYPD because of their gender.”³⁶

These findings are consistent with research from the Williams Institute at UCLA Law School which found that among LGBTQ respondents to a survey, 21% reported verbal assault by police, 3% reported sexual harassment, and 2% reported physical assault by law-enforcement officers. The mistreatment was consistently higher among transgender and gender non-conforming respondents and those of color.³⁷

Reporting by politically motivated NGOs can introduce significant inaccuracy in reporting and public perception. A [detailed analysis](#) of the Anti-Defamation League's annual “audit” of antisemitic hate violence by Shane Burley and Naomi Bennet found “more than a thousand items we believe were misclassified as antisemitic—all cases of speech critical of Israel or Zionism—we found that the data included misapplications of the organization's own standards and often did not provide enough information for us to assess the group's judgment. Our analysis... shows how the conflation of anti-Zionism and antisemitism skews the data—ultimately serving as a reminder of the need for serious statistical analysis done by an organization not beholden to Israel advocacy.”³⁸

Due to the disparate impact of state violence and systemic oppression against New Yorkers, different communities report hate crimes and bias incidents at different rates leading to further distortion of reporting data. This is especially apparent when comparing the high level of reported antisemitic hate incidents to all other types of incidents. It is not that antisemitic incidents are *overreported* but rather that other kinds of hate violence are *underreported*. However this divergence (especially when there is additional confusion about the non- (*physically*) violent nature of most bias incidents) exaggerates the apparent victimization of the Jewish community. When reflected back to Jewish communities, this can lead to more fear and an acute sense of communal isolation. When used to allocate resources, time, and attention from city officials and agencies, it can lead to even worse hate violence prevention outcomes.

36 Police Sexual Violence in NYC, Bustamante, P., Stoudt, B., Mendez-Peñate, I., Community Safety Project, 2025; <https://deserve2bsafe.commons.gc.cuny.edu/police-sexual-violence-report/>

37 Discrimination and Harassment by Law Enforcement Officers in the LGBT Community Williams Institute. Christy Mallory, Amira Hasenbush, and Brad Sears. March 2015. <https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/LGBT-Discrimination-by-Law-Enforcement-Mar-2015.pdf>

38 Examining the ADLs Antisemitism Audit; Shane Burley, Naomi Bennet; Jewish Currents, July, 2024; <https://jewishcurrents.org/examining-the-adls-antisemitism-audit>

WHAT PREVENTS HATE VIOLENCE?

Unfortunately, public safety policy is generally a “fact-free zone.” Policy choices are overwhelmingly driven by public opinion, popular sentiment, political expediency, and institutional inertia. In the case of hate violence prevention and hate crime deterrence, there is also a notable paucity of high-quality research, largely for reasons that are inherent to our overwhelming reliance on criminal punishment strategies.

Researcher Tim Bakken concludes that despite broad political support, there is little empirical evidence that hate crime laws actually reduce the occurrence of hate crimes. Reviewing state and federal laws and crime reporting data, Bakken finds that enforcement is inconsistent, prosecutions are rare, and underreporting makes evaluation nearly impossible. He concludes that these laws primarily serve a symbolic or expressive function — signaling societal condemnation of bias — rather than a proven deterrent effect.³⁹

Research into the impact of policing on hate violence generally finds only effects on reporting and other incidental metrics. For example, the Jones, Mitchell, and Turner paper previously cited found “a number of agency level policies and procedures that were significantly related to an increased number of reported hate crime investigations, even controlling for agency type and size.”⁴⁰ This is mirrored in work by Joshua D. Freilich and Steven M. Chermak at the ASU Center for Problem-Oriented Policing which shows that victim reporting and case handling is improved by problem-oriented, multi-agency initiatives that prioritize hate-crime response, train officers to recognize and investigate bias when it appears in crime reports, and proactively reach out to targeted communities. However, that research also concludes that “law-enforcement responses alone are seldom effective,” and does not suggest that there is a reduction in the prevalence of hate violence due to these strategies.⁴¹

Ultimately, while it is entirely understandable that some marginalized groups and individuals see hate crimes laws and police responses as an expression of societal care for their communities, they do not make those communities any safer. Hate crimes laws and police-based interventions simply have little to no measurable effect on the incidence of hate crimes.

And unfortunately, hate crimes laws come with significant unintended consequences: hate crimes enforcement is plagued by the same racial disparities that define the rest of our criminal legal system. According to the Movement Advancement Project, “the majority of all hate crimes are committed by white people.... Yet, data show that hate crimes reported by state law enforcement are disproportionately listed as having Black perpetrators.”⁴² Researcher Kay Whitlock points out that “The neutral wording of hate crime and related laws is ‘power-evasive.’ When selectively enforced, these laws can morph into instruments of injustice. For example, a South Carolina anti-lynching statute intended to protect African Americans against White mob

39 Bakken, T. (2002). The Effects of Hate Crime Legislation: Unproven Benefits and Unintended Consequences. *International Journal of Discrimination and the Law*, 5(4), 231-246. <https://doi.org/10.1177/135822910200500404> (Original work published 2002)


40 U.S. Hate Crime Investigation Rates and Characteristics: Findings from the National Hate Crime Investigations Study (NHCIS) Author(s): Lisa M. Jones, Ph.D., Kimberly J. Mitchell, Ph.D., Heather A. Turner, Ph.D., 2022

41 Hate Crimes, Problem-Oriented Guides for Police; Freilich, J., Chermak, S. 2013 https://popcenter.asu.edu/sites/g/files/litvpz3631/files/sites/default/files/problems/pdfs/hate_crimes.pdf

42 Movement Advancement Project. July 2021. Policy Spotlight: Hate Crime Laws. www.lgbtmap.org/2021-report-hate-crimes

violence has transformed into a legal tool used disproportionately against young Black men...”⁴³

Figure 17: People of Color Are More Likely To Experience Hate Violence, Yet Law-Enforcement-Recorded Hate Crimes Disproportionately List Black Perpetrators



Note: Not all states collect data on hate crimes, and of those that do, not all report data on the race of suspected offenders. Idaho, Utah, and Wyoming report racial data but are not included here due to reporting inconsistencies or small sample size. Note also that state-reported data shown here reflect the reported race of suspected offenders in law enforcement's incident reports. While these incident reports may lead to arrests, prosecutions, or convictions, actual data on racial demographics of hate crime arrests, prosecutions, or convictions are extremely rare or limited. Sources: Annual crime statistics reported by each listed state across years available between 2013 and 2020. Additional details available upon request. State population data from U.S. Census Bureau, ACS 2019.

Despite the best of intentions, most efforts to date to reduce hate violence have been based on “best guesses” about what might work.

When Jews For Racial & Economic Justice and the NYC Against Hate coalition began our work together in 2019, we knew based on data and our communities’ lived experiences that policing-based responses to hate violence were ineffective. When the city invests heavily in the NYPD Hate Crimes Taskforce and in prosecution, and hate violence only continues to skyrocket, it’s obvious that the existing strategy is a failure. However our interventions were limited by at least two factors: first, scarce resources, and second, the lack of data on what actually works. Therefore we crafted our responses based on asking our communities what they needed, and on the tactics and small-scale success stories of which we were collectively already aware.

The goal of this policy proposal is to, for the first time, ground hate violence prevention tactics in rigorous data and craft our responses accordingly. To do so, for the first time that we are aware of in the hate violence prevention field, we have

Reproduced from: Movement Advancement Project. July 2021. Policy Spotlight: Hate Crime Laws

⁴³ Whitlock, Kay, Reconsidering Hate, Political Research Associates, 2012 <https://politicalresearch.org/sites/default/files/2018-10/HateFrames.pdf>

identified a robust, research-based source of supporting evidence that points us in a clear direction.

We looked at data not from the almost non-existent academic hate crimes literature, but instead from social psychology and from research into social dynamics in conflict zones around the world. There we found a rich source of directly applicable data that provides immediate and clear support for a number of strategies that we believe will proactively reduce the incidence of hate violence in New York City. For the sake of brevity we will not review anything like the complete body of research in these subspecialties, however, the following is representative of the broad academic consensus in these highly relevant fields.

Changing the prevention paradigm

In his classic field experiment, the social psychologist Muzafer Sherif examined how intergroup hostility can emerge and how it can be mitigated. He brought twenty-two twelve-year-old boys with similar backgrounds to a summer camp at Robbers Cave State Park in Oklahoma and randomly divided them into two groups.

Sherif began his experiment by fostering strong in-group identities among the boys by engaging each group separately in bonding tasks. Once the two groups were aware of each other, Sherif introduced a competitive phase in which they vied for limited resources and prizes.

As predicted by his Realistic Conflict Theory, the groups rapidly developed mutual hostility and derogatory attitudes. They engaged in cabin raids and were reluctant to cooperate. But all of this was just table-setting: once the competition phase concluded, Sherif could begin the *real* experiment and what he found was remarkable.

Sherif introduced “superordinate goals” — tasks that both groups could not achieve alone (e.g., jointly pulling a stuck truck, restoring a water supply) and that required intergroup cooperation.

These cooperative tasks succeeded in reducing hostility and intergroup friendships began to form. The children even asked to share bus rides home across social groups.

The key finding is that mere contact or forced interaction between groups did not reduce conflict; *what mattered was common fate and shared goals that aligned group interests*. Sherif concluded that competition over scarce resources reliably generates intergroup conflict, but structured cooperation toward overarching goals can reverse it.

More nuance is added to the picture by studies from Northern Ireland that examine how school structure and ethos influence intergroup friendships between Catholic and Protestant students. The study’s findings suggest that mere demographic mixing does not automatically produce meaningful integration. Instead it is the presence of an intentional multicultural ethos — with institutional support that substantially increases the likelihood of cross-group bonds. The authors conclude that while structural opportunity for intergroup contact is necessary, cultural and normative climates (in this case within schools) are critical in transforming mere *coexistence* into genuine social integration. People need equal status, shared goals,

and supportive institutions to reduce intergroup bias.⁴⁴ These findings go hand-in-hand with another study of schools in Northern Ireland that found that the frequency of cross-group contact (both inside and outside school) was associated with less extreme (more moderate) political attitudes toward the other religious community.⁴⁵



All of this research is confirmatory of Gordon Allport's pioneering work in the social psychology of prejudice. (Allport's famous book, *The Nature of Prejudice*, was published the same year as Sherif's *Robber's Cave* experiment.)

Children participating in the Robbers Cave experiment. University of Akron

Allport argued that prejudice arises not only from ignorance or pathology but from ordinary cognitive processes — how humans categorize and generalize — and from social norms that reinforce group boundaries. He showed that prejudice serves psychological and social functions, offering individuals a sense of belonging and superiority but distorting perception and fostering discrimination.

In a densely populated, richly polyglot, existentially multicultural and multiethnic city like New York, we should understand the generation of prejudice and discrimination as *a natural and unsurprising process that is built into social reproduction and everyday human interaction*.

To be clear we are not saying that these processes are good — on the contrary. We are saying that they should be understood as analogous to the generation of garbage and wastewater. Processes that simply *will* occur as part of city life. And we submit that they are processes that New York City has an institutional interest in managing and minimizing, in much the same way that we manage trash in our streets or weeds in our parks. This will require the creation of enduring public

44 Blaylock, Danielle & Hughes, Joanne & Wölfer, Ralf & Donnelly, Caitlin. (2018). Integrating Northern Ireland: Cross-group friendships in integrated and mixed schools. *British Educational Research Journal*. 44. 10.1002/berj.3452.

45 Stringer M, Irwing P, Giles M, McClenahan C, Wilson R, Hunter JA. Intergroup contact, friendship quality and political attitudes in integrated and segregated schools in Northern Ireland. *Br J Educ Psychol*. 2009 Jun;79(Pt 2):239-57. doi: 10.1348/978185408X368878. Epub 2008 Nov 22. PMID: 19026111.

infrastructure whose goal is to foster dynamic, healthy ties between the thousands of communities that call this city home.

The research suggests that we can meet that challenge.

Allport's most influential contribution to social psychology, the Contact Hypothesis, proposed that direct contact between members of different groups can reduce bias when those groups have equal formal status, support from authorities, and collectively understood social norms, and when those groups engage in active intergroup cooperation with shared goals. His work reframed prejudice as a learned, modifiable attitude rather than as an immutable trait and emphasized that while casual or competitive contact could worsen prejudice, structured, cooperative contact could humanize out-groups and foster empathy.⁴⁶

It is worth noting that Allport's findings are extremely robust. Pettigrew and Tropp's 2006 exhaustive meta-analysis looked at 713 independent samples from 515 studies and found that Allport's research is entirely borne out, and the more rigorous the study, the larger the mean effect size. Their results also suggest that while contact theory was devised originally for racial and ethnic encounters, it can be extended to other groups.⁴⁷

Returning to conflict studies, we find even more useful data.

From 2006–2009 in northern Liberia—a region deeply impacted by civil war, displacement, and weakened institutions—researchers James Fearon, Macartan Humphreys, and Jeremy M. Weinstein implemented a randomized field experiment in conjunction with a Community-Driven Reconstruction (CDR) program administered by the International Rescue Committee.

Villages were randomly assigned to receive local mandates such as the election of community development committees, block grants for public-goods projects, and participatory decision-making for reconstruction. The core questions addressed whether this brief, externally-funded intervention could improve governance, social cooperation, and well-being in post-conflict communities.

The study found that Liberia's CDR program significantly strengthened social cohesion and reduced local intergroup conflict in the short term. In the studied villages, participants were required to cooperate across existing social divisions. Former combatants, women, elders, and youth had to elect project committees, identify needs, and jointly manage small reconstruction grants. This participatory structure fostered new, inclusive norms of decision-making and trust.

The researchers evaluated the experiment using various methodologies. Behavioral evidence came from public-goods games and structured behavioral experiments in which individuals in treated communities contributed more to collective pools, indicating stronger willingness to cooperate with neighbors. Survey results also showed higher reported trust, especially toward people from other clans, religious groups, or war-time factions, and fewer reports of *intra*-community disputes or factionalism.

Importantly, these gains emerged without explicit “truth and reconciliation-style” programming. Cooperation around practical, shared goals (the same

46 Allport, G. W. (1954). *The nature of prejudice*. Addison-Wesley.

47 Pettigrew TF, Tropp LR. A meta-analytic test of intergroup contact theory. *J Pers Soc Psychol*. 2006 May;90(5):751-83. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.90.5.751. PMID: 16737372.

“superordinate tasks” that Sherif explored in his experiment) organically reduced mistrust. Commenting on their findings, the researchers said:

“Under such circumstances we find the evidence of positive program impact – which for a number of the hypothesized outcomes is clear and fairly unambiguous because this was a randomized controlled study – to be remarkable. Our results suggest that patterns of social cooperation and political practices are in fact malleable. Moreover, community-driven projects have the potential to increase faith and trust in village institutions perhaps by giving community leaders an opportunity [to] execute projects for the benefit of villagers. While we are not in a position to say anything about the long-term sustainability of these impacts, the fact that positive effects are observed nearly six months after the program’s conclusion is reassuring.” (Fearon, Humphreys, Weinstein, 2009)

The authors concluded that structured, community-driven development can rebuild micro-level social cohesion and intergroup trust after violent conflict. (They also note that sustained peace and institutional legitimacy require longer-term engagement beyond discrete project cycles.)⁴⁸

If approaches like these can work for communities riven by war, presumably they can work in the bodega and on the playground.

In addition, there is powerful research on the impact of institutions on social cohesion across difference.

In his award-winning book, *Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life*, political scientist Ashutosh Varshney examined why some Indian cities with mixed Hindu-Muslim populations suffer recurrent communal violence while others remain relatively peaceful. He finds that the key explanatory factor is the presence of strong inter-communal civic networks such as trade unions, business associations, professional bodies, and neighborhood organizations that cut across religious lines.

In cities where these horizontal ties between Hindus and Muslims are dense and institutionalised, they act as a kind of social insurance. Individuals from both communities share economic and social stakes, monitor one another, communicate warnings when tensions rise, and impose social costs on those people who might otherwise engage in violence. These networks raise the “costs” of violence because violence threatens the organizational and economic assets of members, while cohesion reduces uncertainty, and fosters cross-group trust.

Conversely, in cities lacking such mixed civic infrastructure, sectarian politics and violence are more likely: maligned leaders mobilize group identity to advance parochial aims, structural communication failures allow rumors to spread, and the social cost of violence is lowered. In short, civic life that is cross-cutting, dense,

48 Fearon JD, Humphreys M, Weinstein JM., How Does Development Assistance Affect Collective Action Capacity? Results from a Field Experiment in Post-Conflict Liberia. *American Political Science Review*. 2015;109(3):450-469. doi:10.1017/S0003055415000283 https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/1423322_file_Weinstein_CGD_WP.pdf

and organized helps prevent communal violence by creating accountability, interdependence, and norm-enforcement across the religious divide.⁴⁹

While all of this data suggests an extraordinarily hopeful path forward for reducing identity-based violence and conflict, we do not mean to imply a simple panacea. On the contrary there are many nuances to the data and pitfalls abound.



JFREJ members doing Drag Story Hour defense, December 2022. Photos By Gili Getz

For example, in two experiments, Richard Crisp and Sarah Beck looked at how an intervention designed to reduce intergroup bias works differently depending on how strongly individuals identify with their in-group. The researchers tested one popular approach to improving group relations — asking people to focus on what their group and another group have in common. The researchers found that interventions that blur group boundaries or encourage overlap may backfire or be ineffective for those who strongly identify with their own group. The threat to group distinctiveness can trigger compensatory, reactionary in-group favoritism (and possibly out-group hostility) and it may work better to respect each group's distinct identity while also showing how both belong to a larger community (i.e. New Yorkers or Brooklynites, etc.). Crisp and Beck's study shows clearly that there is no single method that reduces prejudice for everyone and efforts to reduce prejudice can't be "one-size-fits-all."⁵⁰

So far we have dealt with strategies that address the thrill-seeking, defensive, and retaliatory categories of potential bias motivations. What about the less tractable *mission-driven offenders*?

Studies have shown that deradicalization programs from non-governmental actors, rooted in local communities and often led by former extremists, remain vital initiatives to combat hate violence from right-wing extremist movements.⁵¹ Organizations like [Life After](https://www.lifeafterhate.org/)

[Hate](https://www.lifeafterhate.org/) have found success by offering personalized assistance, such as counseling services, educational opportunities, public service campaigns, and social support systems to encourage individuals to leave extremist movements.⁵²

Research on the effectiveness of deradicalization programs, particularly those addressing white-supremacist and anti-LGBTQ extremism, remains limited and methodologically uneven, but several key themes have emerged. Qualitative studies suggest that disengagement from extremist groups often stems from identity transformation and social detachment, rather than ideological conversion alone. A National Institute of Justice study of 47 former white supremacists found

49 Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life, Varshney, Ashutosh; 2002 <https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300127942/ethnic-conflict-and-civic-life/>

50 Crisp, R. J., & Beck, S. R. (2005). Reducing Intergroup Bias: The Moderating Role of Ingroup Identification. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, 8(2), 173-185. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430205051066> (Original work published 2005)

51 Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Vienna, February 2014 <https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/1/d/111438.pdf>

52 <https://www.lifeafterhate.org/>

that “disengagement was most often precipitated by changes in social relationships and personal priorities rather than by persuasion or formal programs” (Horgan & Braddock, 2016).^{53,54}


One conclusion that can be drawn from such efforts is that recruiting extremists to participate in alternatives is more effective than simply decrying hate speech. And in fact this approach may be effective in reducing all forms of prejudice. Absent this positive redirection of interest to other activities, punitive governmental measures such as policing and incarceration will fail to address the root causes leading individuals to adopt hate ideologies, and may even strengthen extremists’ commitment to insurrectionary struggle in face of what they perceive to be persecution from a repressive state apparatus.



A DRUM Hate Free Zones event, circa 2017

53 DeMichele, M., Simi, P., Blee, K., Research and Evaluation on Domestic Radicalization to Violent Extremism: Research to Support Exit USA, 2021

54 Carthy SL, Doody CB, O'Hora D, Sarma KM. PROTOCOL: Counter-narratives for the prevention of violent radicalisation: A systematic review of targeted interventions. Campbell Syst Rev. 2018 Sep 24;14(1):1-23. doi: 10.1002/CL2.202. PMID: 37131401; PMCID: PMC8427989.



MODALITIES & RECOMMENDATIONS

REINVENTING REPORTING: DATA-DRIVEN PREVENTION

Recommendation: Invest in non-police reporting of hate crimes and bias incidents.

The city should invest in creating and maintaining alternative, non-police reporting channels for hate crimes and other bias incidents and make it easy to find these channels. The New York City Anti-Violence Project maintains a [hotline](#) and [online reporting web page](#) for LGBTQ residents. The “bilingual (English/Spanish), 24-hour, 365-day-a-year crisis intervention hotline is staffed by trained volunteers and professional counselor/advocates, offering support to LGBTQ & HIV-affected survivors of any type of violence, as well as to those who love and support survivors, including those who have lost a loved one to violence.” The hotline receives thousands of calls every year.⁵⁵ AVP’s reporting infrastructure is a model for how community-based organizations (CBOs) can be far better positioned to interact with vulnerable communities than the NYPD or even other city agencies.

There are advantages and disadvantages to basing hotlines within CBOs versus having them run by the city. On balance, we believe that funding CBOs to run them is the preferred solution as community members are far more likely to report to trusted groups based in their communities. However, this means the city has a significant role to play in publicizing the existence of these hotlines and in effectively integrating them into the 311 and 911 systems such that *callers who do not want a police response* do not have one forced upon them. In addition, there must be standardized channels for CBOs to report their data, with appropriate privacy protections, to OPHC or another data aggregator so that all of us can more accurately track and respond to incidents.

JFREJ supports the passage of Council Member Lincoln Restler’s Int 0388-2026, which would require NYCCHR to:

“establish a hotline with telephone, text, and online capabilities for receiving reports from the public regarding incidents motivated by antisemitic, anti-Asian, and gender-based hate or bias, as well as other forms of hate and bias to be designated by the commission. CCHR would offer hotline users support and referrals as appropriate. CCHR would report the number and, to the extent practicable, severity of hate and bias incidents reported to the hotline, disaggregated by type of bias and by the police precinct where the incident occurred, in its annual report.” (*Establishing a hotline and detailed reports on antisemitism and other hate- and bias-related incidents*; New York City Council; Int. 0388-2026.)

Recommendation: Supplement or supplant voluntary reporting and hate crimes data with surveys.

Given these and other barriers, achieving highly accurate reporting is probably an intractable problem. And if the goal is to use crime statistics and voluntary reporting-based metrics to evaluate success or the “state of hate” in NYC, we will always find

⁵⁵ <https://avp.org/get-help/call-our-hotline/>

ourselves misallocating resources, chasing ghosts, and missing the crises brewing right under our noses.

We should instead look at using hyperlocal, statistically sound surveys of residents. We should inquire about whether they have been the victim of a bias incident, ask about their sense of comfort and perceived safety, and ask for their assessment of the state of inter-communal care and cohesion in their neighborhood. This data will allow us to map NYC's "intergroup relations landscape." This will not only better reflect the lived experiences of most New Yorkers, but also allow us to precisely target hotspots, and better differentiate between perception and reality. For example if many members of a group report feeling endangered but there is very little reported hate violence or crime in the area, that could trigger deeper study and a more tailored non-police response.

This may be an ideal fit for community-based participatory research, such as the innovative data-gathering and interpretation conducted by the [CUNY Graduate Center Public Science Project](#). Lisa M. Vaughn, PhD and Farrah Jacquez, PhD, writing for the Journal of Participatory Research Methods, describe this participatory research as:

“...a research-to-action approach that emphasizes direct engagement of local priorities and perspectives (Cornwall & Jewkes, 1995). PR can be defined as an umbrella term for research designs, methods, and frameworks that use systematic inquiry in direct collaboration with those affected by the issue being studied for the purpose of action or change (Cargo & Mercer, 2008). PR prioritizes co-constructing research through partnerships between researchers and stakeholders, community members, or others with insider knowledge and lived expertise (Jagosh et al., 2012). Simply put, PR engages those who are not necessarily trained in research but belong to or represent the interests of the people who are the focus of the research. Instead of the “subjects” of traditional research, PR collaborates with stakeholders, community, constituents, and end-users in the research process.”⁵⁶

Whether or not this particular modality is the right one, the underlying goal should be clear: to establish robust metrics by which to evaluate the state of inter-communal relations at a hyperlocal level and assess city residents' experience of their own safety in place — in the neighborhoods in which they live and work. We believe that this strategy — especially when evaluated side-by-side with NYPD hate crime data — will produce a far richer and more realistic picture of identity-based dysfunction in a manner that will allow for a meaningful, targeted response.

Recommendation: Consider contracting out data integration and management.

The city should look at whether contracting a program like CUNY CHIRRP to handle the integration of data from surveys, NYPD, hotlines, and other reporting channels would improve the quality of the data, lead to better presentation and analysis, and allow for enriching the data with victim interviews and other useful supplementary information.

⁵⁶ Vaughn, L. M., & Jacquez, F. (2020). Participatory Research Methods – Choice Points in the Research Process. Journal of Participatory Research Methods, 1(1). <https://doi.org/10.35844/001c.13244>

PROACTIVE PREVENTION

Recommendation: Intergroup Collaborative Projects (ICPs) - Use collaborative organizing projects to build intergroup relationships; hire regional or community-specific program managers.

This innovative concept draws on the research into intergroup relations we previously cited, and is perhaps the most original and comprehensive element of this paper. The research agrees that a key to positive intergroup relations is a *superordinate goal*—a shared task that transcends the needs of any one group. We propose having the city essentially invest in local community organizing that brings directly-affected communities (communities that may be in tension with one another) together to work on projects that are of mutual interest to each community. This program would ideally leverage existing funding streams so that it is largely budget neutral.

We believe that the city should resource district-based, regional or community-specific program managers throughout the city whose responsibilities include supporting local institutions to engage in collaborative projects across difference that better their neighborhoods and communities. From renovating a playground, to operating a soup kitchen, to tenant organizing, to planning a street fair, we should look at many local activities as potential sites of intergroup relationship building. By intelligently leveraging existing city initiatives across agencies and council districts, this program does not necessarily require a significant budgetary commitment beyond robust staffing.

For example, the city's existing participatory budgeting (PB) process is exactly the type of program that Intergroup Collaborative Projects can piggyback on, giving communities the opportunity to envision, develop, and fight for concrete, material improvements in their neighborhoods, schools, and social infrastructure. Research from a decade of PB in New York City shows that the process excels in reaching residents beyond the “usual suspects” of political participation. In a survey of 51,000 participants, half reported that they had never worked with others in a community setting before.⁵⁷ Further, interviews with approximately 80 participants suggested that the task of developing concrete project proposals helps people from different backgrounds to deliberate in constructive ways.⁵⁸

When it comes to project selection in PB, ICPs could simply compete with the district's other proposals, or each council member could have a certain amount of discretionary funding set aside and earmarked specifically for groups engaging in PB via the hate violence program's ICPs. This has existing precedent in New York's

Case Study: Participatory Budgeting

For participants, conversation about how to meet community need reportedly felt qualitatively different from other public encounters they had.

As one participant noted, “I was able to see the needs [of] the community in a way I've never seen before. ... I didn't know how bad of an asthma cluster there was in public housing. I don't have kids, so I don't know about needs at school. I don't have any relatives who live in senior housing, so I didn't know about the issues they faced.”

Another remarked, “**At the meetings you meet people from all over the community. You may walk by them on a daily basis and not know what they're into. It was a good gathering for people to interact, those for women's rights, LGBT... and say, 'Cool, you're trying to do that, maybe I'll participate in that.'**”

⁵⁷ Alexa Kasdan, Erin Markman, and Pat Covey, *A People's Budget: A Report on the Participatory Budgeting in New York City in 2013–2014* (Community Development Project at the Urban Justice Center, 2014).

⁵⁸ Su, Celina. 2025. *Budget Justice: On building grassroots politics and solidarities*. Princeton University Press. 114

process. After the 2016 election of Trump, New Yorkers responded to increased reported incidents of hate violence with PB projects such as “bystander/upstander” training and self-defense workshops by and for South Asian Muslim women. These projects were notable because they won the PB process in a district where only 13 percent of residents report being Asian (including East Asians and others as well as South Asians). To pass, they needed to win the votes of most residents *not* identifying as the programs’ intended beneficiaries.⁵⁹

According to interviews with participants, engaging in conversations on how to concretely meet one another’s needs was integral to the process. These projects succeeded in winning public funding not because they were culturally sensitive per se, but because they were developed by residents, together.⁶⁰



A JFREJ de-escalation training, November 2023

This approach also has the potential to invigorate and strengthen existing programs including participatory budgeting by bringing in new people and community based organizations and providing additional structure and program management.

While certain types of advocacy may have to be disallowed to avoid conflicts of interest and inappropriate city involvement, many community organizing programs would be eligible for support under this initiative.

Regional program managers would actively seek out opportunities for cross-cultural collaboration by engaging community leaders, organizations, and institutions and help those groups to structure and resource their activities, through both on-the-ground facilitation and assistance in navigating existing city programs. These programs should be implemented for youth as well as adults. This could be in the form of in-school projects or partnerships with afterschool programs or other youth activities programs. These programs can in turn partner with various kinds of non-profits (community organizing CBOs, [arts](#) and [mural](#) organizations, service organizations and charities). These partnerships will then coordinate with and be supported by regional managers and council member district offices (in the case of Participatory Budgeting). Young people are a crucial part of any community-based solution. Young people are more likely to be encouraged to go to a trusted adult to

report bullying, and also will be the ones to benefit most directly from a renewed investment in parks, recreation, and many other city amenities.

For adults, the anchoring institutions would be houses of worship and community centers, local businesses and neighborhood associations, and elected officials’ district offices, and similar local spaces. A key for success will be setting aside funding in agency and already-allocated CBO budgets throughout the city for

59 Su, Celina. 2025. Budget Justice: On building grassroots politics and solidarities. Princeton University Press.

60 Su, Celina. 2025. Budget Justice: On building grassroots politics and solidarities. Princeton University Press.

hate violence programming so that when these requests come in via the regional managers, there is already resourcing available.

This evidence-based strategy is far more likely to be successful in mitigating intergroup tensions than “going directly at the problem” through often fraught town halls and interventions that foreground conflict and dysfunction rather than leaning into an assumption of joyful, productive group interaction and collaboration. Leaders should model this ethos and give community members the opportunity to “be their best selves.” And ongoing leadership development with community members through these programs will also help grow the pool of credible messengers who can be connected with rapid response efforts should an incident occur in their neighborhood.

By combining investments in regional managers with CBO staff funded through OPHC grants, this approach has the potential to create enduring infrastructure with benefits far beyond the immediate goal of hate violence prevention. In addition because of the self-contained nature of each notional project and the utilization of existing agency funding streams and council member items, this approach is inherently scalable from pilot through broad citywide adoption at fairly low cost.

Recommendation: A field program for hate violence prevention.

In order to change people’s views about complex issues, there is simply no substitute for *talking with them*. Normal, transactional door-knocking canvasses of the type typically encountered when volunteering for a political campaign have little long-term impact on canvasee’s opinions. But carefully controlled experiments show that a technique called “deep canvassing” has a substantial persuasive effect. According to the New Conversations Institute, deep canvassing is “a... contact model where canvassers prioritize two things: non-judgmentally inviting a [canvasee] to open up about their real, conflicted feelings on an issue. [And] sharing vulnerably about their own life, and asking curious questions about the [canvasee’s] life (especially the experiences that have shaped how they each feel about the issue). In other words, deep canvassing is about working to create mutual understanding grounded in lived experience, instead of in debate or talking points.”⁶¹

Research from 2016 and 2021 into deep canvassing found a persuasive effect that was still durable when the study ended, months after the canvassing conversation.^{62,63}

“Before the intervention, the treatment and placebo groups scored similarly on this index... After the intervention, the treatment group was considerably more accepting of transgender people than the placebo group ($t = 4.03$; $P < 0.001$). These effects are substantively large: These brief conversations increased positivity toward transgender people, as measured with a survey tool called a “feeling thermometer” (20, 21), by ~10 points, an amount larger than the average increase in positive affect toward gay men and lesbians among Americans between 1998 and 2012 (8.5 points) (see table S22). Figure 1 shows the point estimates at each wave and reveals that these effects persisted longitudinally: The treatment

61 <https://www.newconvo.org/what-is-deep-canvassing>

62 Broockman D, Kalla J. Durably reducing transphobia: A field experiment on door-to-door canvassing. *Science*. 2016 Apr 8;352(6282):220-4. doi: 10.1126/science.aad9713. PMID: 27124458.

63 Kalla, J.L. and Broockman, D.E. (2023), Which Narrative Strategies Durably Reduce Prejudice? Evidence from Field and Survey Experiments Supporting the Efficacy of Perspective-Getting. *American Journal of Political Science*, 67: 185-204. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12657>

group remained more accepting in every follow-up survey.” (Broockman & Kalla, 2016)




Fig. 2. Support for nondiscrimination law by survey wave. (A) Condition means. (B) Differences between the condition means shown above. The 95% confidence intervals surround point estimates; the thicker lines represent one standard error. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering and pretreatment covariates. Defining “transgender” in the item wording revealed that placebo subjects were less supportive of protecting this group ($P < 0.05$, one-tailed). Next, all subjects were less supportive after viewing an opposing ad, but the effect of the conversations endured ($P < 0.05$, one-tailed). However, the ads’ impact dissipated, whereas the conversations’ effect endured ($P < 0.05$, one-tailed).

Reproduced from: Broockman, D., & Kalla, J. (2016). Durably reducing transphobia: A field experiment on door-to-door canvassing

These findings are in agreement with results from social psychology which find that increases in “objective ambivalence” and “attitude complexity,” and decreases in “attitude extremity” flow from high-quality listening, while being “talked at” had a mild effect during an interview, but the effect disappeared shortly after the conversation.⁶⁴ Additional findings show that when there is a power imbalance between canvassers and canvasees, deep canvassing techniques are particularly well-suited.⁶⁵

That said, there is evidence that more traditional canvassing techniques, when properly structured, can have an impact. An Australian randomized controlled trial engaged “participants who had expressed negative or ambivalent attitudes toward Muslim residents in a previous survey. These participants were randomly assigned to receive either no treatment or a 15-minute door-knocking conversation that encouraged empathy building through (1) active processing of new information and (2) perspective taking through personal reflections on past experiences of exclusion.” The study showed that “a simple, structured conversation temporarily

64 Itzhakov, G., Kluger, A. N., & Castro, D. R. (2016). I Am Aware of My Inconsistencies but Can Tolerate Them: The Effect of High Quality Listening on Speakers’ Attitude Ambivalence: The Effect of High Quality Listening on Speakers’ Attitude Ambivalence. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 43(1), 105-120. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167216675339> (Original work published 2017)

65 Bruneau, Emile & Saxe, Rebecca. (2012). The Power of Being Heard: The Benefits of ‘Perspective-Giving’ in the Context of Intergroup Conflict. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*. 48. 855–866. [10.1016/j.jesp.2012.02.017](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2012.02.017).

increased cognitive empathy toward a minority group and significantly reduced prejudice to lasting effect.”⁶⁶

In addition to materially changing individuals’ opinions about their out-group neighbors, deep canvassing also provides us with a database of people in an area who are potential allies and credible messengers that can be engaged to respond to a future crisis, and people who have the potential to be malign actors in their communities who could be followed up with by a CURE violence program (*Main entry: Rapid Incident Response*) or another intervention. And every canvassing conversation is also an opportunity to recruit a local resident to a future canvass or an intergroup collaborative project.

We recommend that The city resource one or more CBOs to pilot a deep canvassing campaign in a selected neighborhood to evaluate the efficacy of this tactic for reducing prejudice as well as testing whether it is effective as a “feeder” for other violence-prevention initiatives.

The same field infrastructure that would support a deep canvassing program would also help in supporting rapid response street canvasses. (*Main entry: Rapid Incident Response*)

Recommendation: Implement a media monitoring program combined with up-to-date demographic data for predictive mapping of potential identity-based conflict.

The city should sponsor an open-source intelligence (OSINT) media monitoring program to identify events online or in the news, rising levels of hate speech or threats of violence targeted at important New York City demographics so that The city and community groups can preemptively intervene before a real-world incident occurs. The city currently alerts organizations that have opted-in about recent violent hate crimes (*OPHC Violent Hate Crime Notification System Alerts*). This is helpful in responding after the fact, but of less utility for prevention. Warning communities that they are facing increased threats and hate speech online could help community leaders and CBOs craft preemptive actions to lower intergroup tensions and mitigate risk to individuals and institutions.

Given the evidence regarding online hate speech showing that deplatforming (removing key actors or networks of hate groups from social media) can lead to reductions in both the production and consumption of hateful content, The city might want to work with social media companies to take down certain posts or ban potentially dangerous users. And based on interesting research showing that psychological inoculation (interventions that teach users to recognise manipulative tactics) increases resistance to manipulative and hateful narratives in social media, The city might want to consider resourcing online rapid response and proactive inoculation strategies targeted at New Yorkers online.⁶⁷

Due to the potential for “mission creep” and misuse of data, as well the need to comply with *Handshu* and *Raza*, we recommend that this be administered as a contract with a third party policy institute or university research program, with the

⁶⁶ Benier, K., Faulkner, N., Ladegaard, I., & Wickes, R. (2024). Reducing Islamophobia through Conversation: A Randomized Control Trial. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 87(4), 461-478.

⁶⁷ McPhedran, R., Ratajczak, M., Mawby, M. et al. Psychological inoculation protects against the social media infodemic. *Sci Rep* 13, 5780 (2023). <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-023-32962-1>

contract terms, data retention and privacy policies, and deliverables to be approved by a council of CBOs and civil liberties groups.

Recommendation: Synthesize media monitoring program with surveys and up-to-date demographic data for predictive mapping of potential identity-based conflict.

Taken together, these efforts may become more than the sum of their parts. The city should leverage its rich existing store of demographic data, data from other sources as needed, plus our new proposed surveys, and combine all of this with the proposed media monitoring program (perhaps assisted by AI) to identify hyperlocal geographic hotspots (using repeated keywords and shared photographs) where hate violence is more likely to occur so that proactive intervention is possible.

These predictions can be short-term and hyperlocal, but we can also look more broadly at rapidly-changing neighborhoods and new immigrant populations and begin inoculating communities *before* tensions spill over.

Because research shows that bias incidents mostly take place within the context of people's everyday lives (i.e., on their commutes, while shopping, etc.), it should then be possible to map corridors and specific locations where incidents are more likely to take place (the most used train lines in an area; major local supermarkets, etc.) for interventions: materials distribution; PSA advertising; upstander trainings for the public; de-escalation trainings for store staff; diversity and upstander workshops in schools; etc.).

It is possible that all of this will just tell us what we already know — that the areas and groups likely to be targeted are exactly the ones we might guess. But it is also possible that informative and even surprising new patterns might emerge.

By using modern tools of real-time data collection, analysis, and mapping, we begin to move from inert and inaccurate victim report harvesting to genuine violence *prevention* — our primary goal.

Recommendation: Scale and set ambitious metrics for de-escalation (upstander) training.

One of the most important modalities for addressing hate violence is de-escalation training (which in our usage incorporates what is often referred to as “upstander” or “bystander” intervention training). The city should not only make a large investment in building the capacity of key organizations to provide these trainings at scale to far more New Yorkers — it should make educating residents about effective intervention a core priority of any coherent program to respond to violence.

De-escalation training teaches ordinary people how to recognize and safely respond to incidents of street harassment or identity-based violence. The Center for Anti-Violence Education (CAE [an NYC Against Hate member organization]) provides harm interruption, or de-escalation and safety trainings with a unique hate-violence intervention lens which combines tangible skills with an understanding of how bias manifests. According to CAE, “harm interruption workshops are designed to equip those facing hate and violence with de-escalation skills and empower bystanders with the tools they need to help those facing harassment by choosing intentionally

from a continuum of tactics. This approach offers New Yorkers unique and critical options for keeping our communities as safe as possible and mitigating violence.”

Most of the research on bystander intervention focuses heavily on sexual violence or interpersonal and intimate partner violence, but because the practices and goals are similar, the data is still instructive. Studies show that bystander intervention trainings make people more likely to step in when they see signs of intimate partner violence, at least in the short term. Across dozens of studies, participants who complete these programs report feeling more confident and responsible to act, and they are more likely to say they’ve actually intervened in situations of possible abuse afterward. A 2022 meta-analysis by Sihyun Park and Sin-Hyang Kim found clear improvements in “action to intervene,” meaning real or intended helping behaviors, and even larger improvement in awareness or intentionality.⁶⁸

This tactic is evidence-based, it is highly scalable, and critically, it allows us to advocate for an ethos: to work toward resetting citywide norms around how we treat each other as neighbors. As we have seen from our research, shared norms are an important component of modifying group behavior. The core ethos of upstander intervention is that *New Yorkers take care of each other*. It is in the city’s interest to promote the notion that the safety of our neighbors is a collective responsibility. It is not something that we can simply outsource to the NYPD for any number of reasons. Understanding how to safely intervene when we see someone being targeted for harassment or violence should be part of every New Yorker’s baseline “toolkit” for how to navigate the city and behave in public.

- The city should set appropriately challenging but achievable metrics for the number of residents to be trained in a given year, with a focus on critical target populations and cohorts such as young people.
 - As we grow our training capacity, The city should consider experimenting with innovative metrics (like skill density within a given area) based on the assumption that what we want is to increase the likelihood that in any public place at least one person in close proximity has had some form of de-escalation training. (Ideally we would also want people who have been through one of our anti-bias trainings or diversity education or cultural events, or been part of one of our cross-cultural community development projects.) This kind of metric will allow us to at least notionally quantify the relationship between our training and education efforts, and real-world safety outcomes.
- In addition we should look at (and budget for) multilingual bus shelter, subway, and other public service advertising explaining best practices and reinforcing the norms we have outlined. (We recognize that when it is the city and not an NGO promoting citizen intervention there may be legal liabilities and other considerations that will require creativity and

68 Park, Sihyun & Kim, Sin-Hyang. (2022). A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis of Bystander Intervention Programs for Intimate Partner Violence and Sexual Assault. *Psychology of Violence*. 13. 93-106. 10.1037/vio0000456.

flexibility in our messaging, however the value of the upstander modality should motivate us to make this work at scale.)

Recommendation: Diffuse de-escalation and upstander skills spatially in current and predicted future hotspots (communities at elevated risk).

In addition, there is room for improvement in the targeting of our intervention trainings. Currently most of these trainings occur when requested by a local CBO or institution. This “demand-driven” training is valuable — demand is a bottom-up community driven assessment of need and we believe the City should increase funding for the ongoing work of CBOs that provide upstander intervention training. (The city should also explore ways to bring age-appropriate adaptations of these workshops and the ethos that they promote to schools and other youth programs.)

But remember that research shows that hate crimes overwhelmingly occur in the neighborhoods, where targeted populations live, and in close proximity to people’s homes.⁶⁹ Therefore we believe we can do better by piloting *risk-driven* responses that bring trainings and other resources to targeted communities, vulnerable community members, and at-risk neighborhoods *before* an incident occurs.

For example, as part of AAF’s Hope Against Hate Campaign, AAF worked with their partners to administer their Safe Zones program and create a network of small businesses poised to provide safety information to targeted Asian-Americans. The goal of this program was to create additional access points for resources for those affected by anti-Asian violence and to train business owners and their staff with techniques to de-escalate and potentially mediate unsafe situations.



Participants in a *Trained Not Armed* workshop. Photo by Barry Williams/Daily News

[Trained, Not Armed](#), a program piloted by the Mayor’s Office of Criminal Justice (MOCJ) which trained bodega owners in de-escalation techniques is another excellent model. The program focused on interactions between store staff and

⁶⁹ King, Ryan & SUTTON, GRETCHEN. (2013). High times for hate crimes: Explaining the temporal clustering of hate-motivated offending. *Criminology*. 51. 10.1111/1745-9125.12022.

customers, and on overcoming language barriers to safely navigate challenging situations.

In addition to training local business employees in high-risk neighborhoods in de-escalation, tactics can include handing out multilingual educational materials, 5-minute “pop-up” trainings in transit hubs and on subway cars/buses. We could also look at institutionalizing and expanding “Safe Haven” programs in partnership with local businesses. [See “Recommendation: budget for more (and more responsive) PSA advertising; shift the content of HV prevention messaging.]

Recommendation: Budget for more (and more responsive) PSA advertising; shift the content of HV prevention messaging.

Public awareness anti-bias messaging from the city can be an important tool, but we are concerned that the messaging in our ads has historically not been effective. The city should experiment with and evaluate the impact of shifting or supplementing the content of this messaging.

Recent campaigns the city has run are the [MTA/NYPD *Hate Has No Place in Our Transportation System*](#) campaign and the [NYCCHR/DCLA *I Still Believe in our City* campaign](#), both in 2020, as well as a relaunch of *Hate Has No Place* in 2021.^{70,71}

To the best of our knowledge, there is no publicly available evaluation data to gauge the effectiveness of these campaigns. Given that “success” would be a reduction in hate violence incidents, and given what we know about the accuracy of HV reporting, it is hard to see how there could be any meaningful assessment of the campaigns’ impacts.



The two campaigns could not be more different. The *Hate Has No Place* ads are not targeted at any one category of identity-based violence and are entirely anodyne in both text and imagery; *I Still Believe in our City* features [vibrant, beautiful artwork by Amanda Phingbodhipakkiya](#) that is aimed directly at COVID-inspired anti-Asian hate.⁷² *I Still Believe* also has an [interactive online component](#) with New



(L) *I Still Believe in our City* artwork by Amanda Phingbodhipakkiya

(R) *Hate Has No Place in our Transportation System* (MTA/NYPD)

70 <https://www.mta.info/press-release/new-mta-marketing-push-combat-anti-asian-hate-crimes>

71 <https://www.nyc.gov/assets/cchr/downloads/pdf/press-releases/I-STILL-BELIEVE-IN-OUR-CITY.pdf>

72 <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/02/arts/design/public-art-covid-race-subway.html>

Yorkers contributing statements about their love for the city, and a page of excellent anti-bias resources for those who navigate to the website.

However both campaigns raise obvious questions. Who is the intended audience? How do we expect them to react? Why do we think this messaging will be effective with that audience?

For both ads the answer is unclear. And while the *I Still Believe* campaign is far more eye-catching, creative, and specific, it may in fact suffer from a more acute lack of direction than *Hate Has No Place*. That doesn't mean it isn't valuable or effective. We honestly cannot know. What we can say is that *Hate Has No Place* is a simple norms reinforcement campaign. And at least that idea — promoting broadly shared norms — is one of our evidence-backed criteria for what inhibits identity-based violence. So while we can't judge the effectiveness of either campaign, one does have some empirical justification while the other does not. In fact, based on additional research (discussed below), the “Asians are here to stay” messaging might increase racial resentment in some people in the short term.^{73,74} The research also says that in the long term, messages that promote justice and equality win out, so we are not in any way objecting to a lovely artistic campaign such as this one. But we suggest that this sort of public campaign should be supplanted by messaging of a different type.



Asian American Federation
Hope Against Hate event

Targeting people who are already predisposed to commit acts of hate violence and attempting to talk them out of it with messages of tolerance is likely difficult going. We believe it makes sense to try targeting the majority of New Yorkers who are already appalled by hate violence but who may not know *what to do in the moment* if they witness street harassment. By using an abbreviated “upstander how-to” we can give people concrete, empowering actions to take. We suggest underpinning this with a strong “New Yorkers take care of each other” message — also a norm shift, but we believe a more potent one than the word “Respect.” The goal of this messaging is to

73 Abou-Chadi, T., & Finnigan, R. (2019). Rights for same-sex couples and public attitudes toward gays and lesbians in Europe. *Comparative Political Studies*, 52(6), 868–895. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414018797947>

74 Tessa L. Dover, Brenda Major, Cheryl R. Kaiser; Members of high-status groups are threatened by pro-diversity organizational messages; *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, Volume 62, 2016, Pages 58-67, ISSN 0022-1031. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2015.10.006>

promote a sense that the city and the safety of our neighbors is our shared collective responsibility.

These efforts should be paired with our proposed survey [see: Reinventing Reporting] to better evaluate the effectiveness of this messaging.

Recommendation: Explore a hotline for real-time support in moments of crisis.

Directly related to de-escalation training, The city could explore creating a 24/7/365 hotline (and/or a smartphone app) for New Yorkers to call to get real-time support in moments of crisis. One of the things we hear over and over again is that when people witness incidents of harassment or potential violence unfolding, they don't know what to do. Calling the police is a one-size-fits-all response which may not be appropriate in all situations, and which many city residents may be reluctant to do for the reasons we have already discussed. As we have explained, not all hate violence rises to the level of a *crime*. In addition, police response takes time and the NYPD will often arrive too late to directly intervene in an incident of harassment — at best they may be able to effect an arrest after the fact.

Providing city residents with a well-publicized resource that they can access at a moment's notice to get immediate advice about how to keep themselves and others safe during an unfolding situation could help to address one of the core insights of de-escalation praxis: that it is difficult to act alone, and it is vital to have as much help as possible. It may be hard for individuals to get help from strangers in a crisis. Staffed with experts in de-escalation and bystander intervention, and with the ability to call on other city resources (EMT, NYPD, B-HEARD teams/mental health response) a hotline would act like an “ally on demand” during these potentially tense and disorienting situations.

A hotline such as this doesn't need to be limited to crisis response — it should be regarded as one more channel for New Yorkers to report incidents, get help, and access resources without requiring NYPD involvement. By connecting callers with appropriate community-based organizations, a city-sponsored hotline can also help to strengthen NGO-based mutual aid programs and NGO services beyond those offered by city agencies. And for city residents who want to reach out to the NYPD, a hotline would help address the issue of public uncertainty about what

Case Study: Day Against Hate

On February 13, 2020, JFREJ led eight other community organizations for a citywide Day Against Hate. **The NYC Against Hate team organized an incredible twenty-five Day Against Hate events all across New York City.**

The goal of the Day Against Hate was to draw attention to New York's epidemic of hate violence and for communities across New York to come together, learn concrete skills, and build the relationships we need to better protect ourselves and each other from hate violence. The core of most Day Against Hate events was an “upstander” training, coordinated by the experts at the Center for Anti-Violence Education.

The “day” started early, on February 12th, with a kick-off press conference at the Museum of Jewish Heritage featuring leaders from the NYC Against Hate coalition and then-City Council Members Brad Lander and Helen Rosenthal, and Public Advocate Jumaane Williams. At the press conference, the coalition debuted its new policy platform, which lays out a powerful vision for a more effective response to hate violence.

And then, on February 13, the incredible energy that we had been building for weeks was unleashed: a training with 50 Jewish young adults in one room in Manhattan; a training with a half-dozen Muslim women in Bay Ridge; a workshop with Black Jews, and non-Jewish Black allies in Crown Heights; a training with 25 high-engaged interfaith leaders and clergy in Staten Island; a packed CopWatch training; a rapid-response training; an intercultural street canvass in Kensington; and a live-streamed panel discussion on antisemitism in the housing justice movement, organized by the Met Council on Housing.

And that's just a handful of the events that happened throughout New York on the Day Against Hate!

constitutes a hate crime rather than a non-criminal incident of hate speech, etc. and could help to encourage more accurate reporting.

Recommendation: Explore accompaniment programs as an ongoing citywide service.

The city should explore accompaniment programs as both a potential ongoing citywide service and as a rapid response service offered to residents of an area where a bias incident has occurred.



Organizations like the Asian American Federation (through its [Community Companions](#) program) and the Arab-American Association of New York (AAANY [an NYC Against Hate coalition member]) have piloted accompaniment programs during periods of increased identity-based violence. AAF's program trains volunteers in de-escalation, situational awareness, and upstander intervention techniques. Volunteers provide protective presence by walking through high-foot-traffic areas, such as near main streets, subway stations, food pantries, and small businesses, to provide real-time de-escalation or support services to community members before violence occurs, and they provide protective accompaniment by escorting community members safely to local destinations, such as their homes. Similar programs also exist on many college campuses.

(A different but still interesting model to look at are services like [ChaufHER](#), [She Taxis](#), and [Just Her](#) — rideshare apps designed specifically for women to help address gender-based violence, with female drivers and features like in-app SOS buttons and rider verification. Similarly apps like [RaveGuardian](#) utilize technology to help users safely travel to and from events and enjoy nightlife without fear.)

By combining services like accompaniment, technologies like those being explored by RaveGuardian, and resources like our proposed hotline, discrete interventions have the potential to become more than the sum of their parts.

Research on the impact of accompaniment programs is extremely limited. However where it exists it is positive. A study published in the journal *Regional Science and Urban Economics* looked at 2005–2008 data from Be On the Safe Side (BOSS), a safe ride program offered by the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. The study, which controlled for prevailing crime rate fluctuations, weather, program hours, and other variables, found that the safe ride program resulted in a remarkable 14% reduction in crime in the program's operating area. It also shows that “as the program increases the rides delivered by one standard deviation, crime declines by



Day Against Hate
events and canvassing,
February, 2020

more than 8%. Increasing the [availability of rides] is at least as effective at reducing violent crime as it is at reducing nonviolent crime.”⁷⁵

While the empirical data is limited, it's clear that by providing a significant measure of immediate, material protection to individuals upon request, these programs positively impact users' perception of safety. For example, AAF's Community Companion volunteers *reported* that their services increased feelings of safety with community members, and were perceived to contribute to the prevention of future bias incidents.

For obvious reasons these programs are difficult to scale and run as a consistent on-demand service. They will not be available to many populations and geographic areas, and may be underutilized due to the difficulty of sufficiently publicizing the existence of the program. Due to lack of flexible funding to support volunteer recruitment and retention, it is challenging to sustain volunteer participation. It takes time to build community trust of the program, especially when accompanying community members to their homes. It is difficult to find multilingual staff and volunteers. The programs require dedicated full time staff to troubleshoot issues and ensure the program runs smoothly. And the program can only run during times that volunteers or staff are available: like public transit, if the service is not perceived as being reliable enough to incorporate into one's day-to-day routines, it will not be used.

While these capacity and scaling issues may appear daunting, it is important to remember that we take it for granted that tens of thousands of uniformed police officers are on duty at all times, and that services like EMS and FDNY can be reliably dispatched on-demand at the behest of any New Yorker. And yet these huge, well-resourced institutions have very little to offer New Yorkers when it comes to *preventing* violence. New Yorkers would objectively be better served by programs that can prophylactically protect them from potential violence and harassment than they are by police officers who will likely only end up taking a statement after an incident has already occurred.

We believe the city should resource existing accompaniment programs, learn from them, and study the practicality of piloting a neighborhood-based or citywide accompaniment system.

RAPID INCIDENT RESPONSE

Hate crimes and incidents of hate violence will often trigger an immediate response by city agencies, local groups, and community-based organizations. However the degree to which these activities are strategic, effective, and coordinated vary in the extreme. In addition, these responses are generally not reliable or sustainable; they cannot always be counted on to occur, or occur in a manner that appears appropriate to an incident. This can be confusing for all involved actors. Why does one community seem to get more attention than another? Why did allies show up in moment A but not in moment B? For targeted communities, these inconsistencies can foster resentment. For CBOs, the inability to respond consistently and well due to capacity constraints produces frustration and guilt. For all involved, it can often feel like something should happen after an incident, but it's not always clear what

⁷⁵ Bryan Weber, Can safe ride programs reduce urban crime?, *Regional Science and Urban Economics*, Volume 48, 2014, Pages 1-11, ISSN 0166-0462, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2014.04.006>.

should happen or why.

We believe the (articulated as well as latent) goals of rapid response are generally:

- Preventing further violence by the (actual or suspected) perpetrator groups and individuals;
- Preventing retaliatory violence by target groups;
- Shifting public narratives about both target and (actual or suspected) perpetrator groups;
- Re-inscribing social norms;
- Providing material support to survivors and to high-risk individuals and institutions;
- Signaling city government “care” for targeted communities;

We believe the most common rapid response modalities are:

- Protests and public communications by the target group;
- Solidaristic protests and public communications by both target, ally, and (real or suspected) perpetrator group;
- NYPD HCTF investigatory response;
- NYPD “hotspot” deployments and deployments to high-risk institutions (parking patrol cars outside of synagogues);
- Interpersonal outreach (council members calling local leaders, for example);
- Public education efforts including:
 - Intergroup diversity and anti-bias education within local institutions and public schools;
 - De-escalation and self-defense trainings (led by organizations such as the [Center for Anti-Violence Education](#) and [Malikah](#)) within local institutions.

Many of these response modalities (such as interpersonal expressions of solidarity to community leaders) may have positive impacts that cannot be directly measured; some may not appear to pay immediate dividends but are valuable in building trust and relationships in the long term. However some are at least partially evaluable, namely:

- Protests and public communications by the target group;
- Solidaristic protests and public communications by both target and (real or suspected) perpetrator group;

Counterintuitively, research in political science and social psychology supports the idea that when identity-based movements or groups mobilize in very public ways, it often triggers reciprocal opposition — a process known as “reactive mobilization” or “status-threat backlash.” For example, it will be unsurprising to anyone familiar with the history of the civil rights movement that research confirms that reminders of demographic or cultural change can increase conservative and exclusionary

attitudes among white Americans.^{76,77} Interesting research by Joel Carr following the 2020 uprisings in the wake of the police murders of George Floyd and Breonna Taylor found that “recorded anti-Black hate crime increased by up to 15 incidents per day or 259 percent in June 2020.” and that “recorded anti-White hate crime increased by up to 4 incidents per day or 165 percent in June 2020.”⁷⁸ Similar trends are suggested with regard to the movement for LGBTQ rights and in response to increased immigration, and in general when high-status groups encounter efforts toward social diversity.^{79,80,81}

This is honestly somewhat heartbreaking. But there are also far more positive indications in the available data.

First, according to research on hate crimes by Susan Olzak at Stanford, “Protests centered on attributes that signal a group’s identity (such as skin color, nationality, or sexual orientation) increase the salience of a group’s boundary (Fox and Guglielmo 2012) and amplify polarized reactions. As a result, support for an identity group deepens support among sympathizers and hostility among opponents (Eger and Olzak 2023). Overall, collective actions intensify preexisting attitudes toward marginalized groups. *Accordingly, to the extent that protests by an identity group remain peaceful, support for the vulnerable identity group should rise* [emphasis added].”⁸²

Second, it suggests the inherent power of *solidaristic* action following a bias incident. The data shows that when people witness members of their own group showing support or friendship toward an out-group, they may begin to view that out-group more favorably. Researchers Loris Vezzali, Stefano Pagliaro, Gian Di Bernardo, Shelley McKeown, and Veronica Cocco called this the “secondary transfer effect”—positive effects that spread beyond the people who actually take part in the event. However, the authors also note that this effect is not automatic: solidarity must be seen as genuine and respectful, not self-serving or performative. Overall, the research suggests that public displays of cross-group solidarity can help improve intergroup relations and reduce bias, at least in the short term.⁸³ And in a fascinating analysis of existing social science research, Nurit Shnabel and Johannes Ullrich state that, “our findings optimistically reveal that under certain circumstances advantaged groups are willing to sacrifice some of their advantages to restore their positive group image... reassurance of warmth

76 Craig, M. A., & Richeson, J. A. (2014). On the Precipice of a “Majority-Minority” America: Perceived Status Threat From the Racial Demographic Shift Affects White Americans’ Political Ideology: Perceived Status Threat From the Racial Demographic Shift Affects White Americans’ Political Ideology. *Psychological Science*, 25(6), 1189–1197. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797614527113> (Original work published 2014)

77 Jost, J. T., Langer, M., Badaan, V., Azevedo, F., Etchezahar, E., Ungaretti, J., & Hennes, E. P. (2017). Ideology and the limits of self-interest: System justification motivation and conservative advantages in mass politics. *Translational Issues in Psychological Science*, 3(3), e1–e26. <https://doi.org/10.1037/tps0000127>

78 Carr, Joel, 2022. “BLM protests and racial hate crime in the United States,” Working Papers 2022008, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Business and Economics.

79 Transnational Backlash and the Deinstitutionalization of Liberal Norms: LGBT+ Rights in a Contested World Kristopher Velasco *American Journal of Sociology* 2023 128:5, 1381–1429

80 Abou-Chadi, T., & Finnigan, R. (2019). Rights for same-sex couples and public attitudes toward gays and lesbians in Europe. *Comparative Political Studies*, 52(6), 868–895. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414018797947>

81 Tessa L. Dover, Brenda Major, Cheryl R. Kaiser; Members of high-status groups are threatened by pro-diversity organizational messages; *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, Volume 62, 2016, Pages 58–67, ISSN 0022-1031. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2015.10.006>.

82 Olzak, Susan. (2024). The Effect of Protests, Violent Hate Crimes, and Hate Groups on Support for an Identity Group. 10.31235/osf.io/wa8ng_v1.

83 Vezzali, L., Pagliaro, S., Di Bernardo, G. A., McKeown, S., & Margherita Cocco, V. (2023). Solidarity across group lines: secondary transfer effect of intergroup contact, perceived moral distance, and collective action. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 53, 450–470. <https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2914>

may be an effective strategy through which members of disadvantaged groups can encourage advantaged-group members to behave in a way that is consistent with their restored moral identity and cooperate towards social change.”⁸⁴

It is not enough for members of the target group to rally and demand their rights—in fact that can sometimes promote backlash and retaliatory hate

violence. Instead, through demonstrations of solidarity, we get to see members of our own group supporting our neighbors and treating them with kindness and respect in moments of crisis while at the same time we are condemning the behavior of norm-breaking in-group members.

Successful demonstrations of solidarity can also help break both interpersonal and media narratives about inherent, eternal, inevitable, or universal enmity between social groups. This also helps to re-inscribe social norms and emphasize the unacceptability of the incident to peers.

Examples of what this can look like include our community’s response to the 2018 mass shooting at the Tree of Life Synagogue in Pittsburgh. Within hours of the attack, scores of individuals and organizations we’ve worked closely with reached out to JFREJ to ask us how they could show up for the Jewish community and stand boldly against antisemitism. In particular, our Muslim and Arab partners quickly mobilized to provide security for our rapid response vigil, mirroring the ways JFREJ has provided security for Arab and Muslim partner events. Together we organized a Solidarity Shabbat and Safety Patrol the Friday after the shooting, with over 100 people huddled in the pouring rain, in Diversity Plaza in Jackson Heights.

JFREJ had been organizing the Jewish community in Queens to stand alongside

immigrants in the most concentrated immigrant neighborhood in our city. When danger struck in our own community, it was these same partners, hailing from South Asian, Latino, Nepali and Filipino communities, along with members of the Arab Muslim community, who showed up at our interfaith Solidarity Shabbat. They came with signs in Urdu, Bangla, Spanish, and Tagalog, and created a protective circle around us as we did our Shabbat ritual, led entirely by our member leaders

Case Study: Chinese American Planning Council

We have piloted community conversations to tackle tough issues like public safety, anti-Asian hate, immigration, homelessness and more. We designed an in-language curriculum around public safety based on examples from Mariame Kaba and Local Progress, and held conversations in safe, structure spaces. We are exploring using Story Circles methodology to deepen this work.

Additionally, we have used food and meals as an important tool for building solidarity across groups, like our Breaking Bread discussion series that brought groups of diverse age, race, gender and other identity together around a structured discussion and meal, or the meals we hosted to bring together Chinese community members and Venezuelan Asylum seekers that had recently been moved into Chinatown.

We take an education approach to help community members heal from civic trauma (a result of intergenerational political trauma and living in a fear-based political system) to shift towards feeling hopeful and empowered. Community members build a solidarity mindset and a resilient and healthy relationship to the political process and trust in civic institutions. This means that people learn how to engage on social and political issues. People have strong defenses against mis/disinformation and fear mongering. They can analyze the systems and power structures behind issues.

We do this through repeated training series with community members aimed at understanding how systems of power and the political system work. We do this in conjunction with individual 1:1 organizing to bring community members into this work. As part of this training, we also teach community members to identify mis and disinformation and why it happens (and who benefits from it).

84 D. Manekin, T. Mitts, & Y. Zeira, The politics of allyship: Multiethnic coalitions and mass attitudes toward protest, *Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.* 121 (19) e2314653121, <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2314653121> (2024).

and Rabbinic council co-chair in Queens, to keep us safe — entirely without needing the presence of the NYPD.

However this kind of profound community support cannot go one way: this template for Muslims providing security for Jews was set when scores of JFREJ members came out to protect our partners in MPower Change and the New York State Immigration Action Fund at their 2017 Iftar in the Streets, in the wake of President Trump's sustained Islamophobic assault on the Muslim community. As our Muslim siblings broke their fast for Ramadan (and as we marked the end of Shavuot) JFREJ's members lined the perimeter of the police barricades, facing the street with locked arms, in order to protect our Muslim friends as they kneeled in prayer. We then broke bread (more accurately, dates, halal chicken over rice, and pizza) together.

This is what real intergroup solidarity looks like. It requires a willingness to take risks together and it requires trust that cannot be generated on demand. It must be built *before* a crisis arrives and before communities are at their most raw and vulnerable.

Recommendation: Better utilize and structure the Violent Incident Notification System.

We recommend exploring tactics for more effectively leveraging the Violence Incident Notification System. It is currently a largely one-way communication channel with no obvious pathway for follow-up. We believe it should be integrated into a more systematized rapid incident response protocol, likely led by the regional program managers and/or appropriate CBOs, which would (if our recommendations are followed) be properly resourced and positioned to reliably execute a response to most incidents. In addition, the city should explore whether adequate privacy protections could be put in place to allow service providers and other CBOs to connect directly with the person who experienced the incident to share resources and direct assistance, without survivors having to first navigate the victim services gantlet.


Recommendation: Resource full-time CBO staff ([*Main entry: Building the Field*](#)).

The primary barrier to rapid response shows-of-solidarity is organizational capacity. It is very difficult to rapidly coordinate a plan, work out the logistics, and mobilize a community while pre-existing work necessarily proceeds unaffected. These are events that are not on anyone's workplan. They can occur over weekends and on holidays. And our very busy community based organizations are generally already working at (or over) capacity on programs that are vitally important for their communities.

In order to create genuine capacity for hate violence prevention (rather than just creating additional under-resourced *obligation*) DCS/OPHC/PATH Forward

Shapes
community
opinion and
creates allies.

Activates
allyship and
respect to
create material
safety in
communities.



Helps to inoculate
New Yorkers against
stereotypes and bigotry.

should fund CBOs at a level that allows them to hire additional full time staff who can maintain enough spare capacity to support rapid response on a moment's notice.

It should be noted that even with this intervention, it will likely not be possible to respond to every event with the same level of commitment—after all, our organization's members also have capacity limitations. But it would be a significant step in the right direction. Alongside CBO staff, OPHC should work to coordinate rapid response to events as needed, in partnership with community and elected leaders.

There is no single modality that this recommendation attaches to, however one that JFREJ has used repeatedly is doing a street canvass paired with a mini-upstander training, in partnership with a CBO that works in the area where the incident occurred. This takes a lot of work to pull off quickly and doing it for more than a few incidents a year is impossible without a significant investment of resources.

Recommendation: Better integrate the CCHR Bias Response Team & Community Relations Bureau with other rapid response efforts.

The [Commission's Community Relations Bureau](#) works to support and stabilize communities after incidents of bias have occurred. The Team responds to need identified by the harmed communities. Examples of the Commission's responses include:

- Distributing literature to local businesses and community centers outlining protections under the City Human Rights Law;
- Partnering with local schools and youth-focused community centers and programs to provide young people with educational programming on empowering members of marginalized groups and standing up to bias;
- Canvassing neighborhoods with local community leaders, elected officials, and community-based organizations;
- Working with sister city agencies on days of action or days of visibility, which are coordinated Citywide outreach efforts to raise awareness on specific issues;
- Educating impacted community members on their rights and opportunity to file a complaint with the Commission; and
- Referring incidents to CCHR's Law Enforcement Bureau for investigation where appropriate.

These critical efforts should be coordinated with other city rapid response programs to maximize impact and tailor responses to the nature of the incident.

Recommendation: Improve training for NYPD officers on hate crimes response.

As we have previously discussed, NYPD HCTF investigatory response and NYPD "hotspot" surges and deployments to high-risk institutions (parking patrol cars outside of synagogues for example) are unlikely to produce reductions in hate

violence, and arresting the perpetrator of a specific crime is unlikely to lead to a hate crime prosecution.

NYPD engagement that is perceived to take hate crime reports seriously may help advance the goal of signaling city government “care” for targeted communities. That must be balanced against the many potential drawbacks to increased police presence in a community and distrust for the NYPD beyond the immediate desires of a hate violence survivor. Regardless, when survivors do want NYPD involvement, the NYPD should take their reports seriously and behave with sensitivity to the needs of the targeted individual and community.

Recommendation: Implement a “whole of government” approach to anti-bias education ([Main entry: Hyperlocal Cultural Competency And Anti-Bias Education](#)).

The city can coordinate a “whole of government” (W.o.G.) approach to address relations between key groups that piggybacks anti-bias education onto any



CAE youth and friends practicing self defense skills at their annual *Ode To Community* event

appropriate existing program in a manner that is smart and targeted. This tactic can be proactive, to reduce *defensive* violence, and it can also be used as a form of rapid or medium-term incident response to reduce *retaliatory* violence — when a bias incident occurs, moving quickly to create very public and well publicized opportunities for communities to learn about and celebrate each other has the potential to interrupt the spread of stereotypes and misinformation.

Recommendation: To prevent retaliatory violence, support research into the applicability of Violence Interrupter programs to bias crimes.


Given what we know about the efficacy of violence interruption programs, the city should support research into the applicability of CURE Violence and other models to bias crimes. The Cure Violence model “relies on three key elements to stop the transmission of violent behavior: interrupting transmission directly, identifying and changing the thinking of... those at highest risk of perpetrating violence, and changing group norms regarding violence.” These programs, which model violence as a transmissible disease, are a direct implementation of the public health model to violence prevention.⁸⁵ Mayor Adams came into City Hall promising to invest in these programs, but provided no additional money once budget season came

⁸⁵ “Cure Violence: A Public Health Model to Reduce Gun Violence” Jeffrey A. Butts, Caterina Gouvis Roman, Lindsay Bostwick, and Jeremy R. Porter 2015

around.⁸⁶ After an outcry by advocates and state grants, additional funding was added in FY24.⁸⁷

Researchers at John Jay College, looking at two of these programs, Man Up! and S.O.S. South Bronx (a project of the Center for Justice Innovation) found that “gun violence rates declined significantly in two neighborhoods operating programs inspired by the Cure Violence model. In an area of East New York, Brooklyn, gun injuries fell 50 percent (from 44 to 22) following the implementation of a type of Cure Violence program. One South Bronx neighborhood experienced 35 shooting victimizations in the four years before Cure Violence opened, but just 13 in the first four years after the program launched.” They also found that the programs had a lasting impact on young men in the target neighborhoods, who reported “declining support for violence as a means of settling personal disputes, and the relative size of this change was better than it was among young men from similar neighborhoods without Cure Violence programs.”

The New York City Council’s Data Team performed its own study of New York’s CURE Violence programs. They found that “precincts that received Cure experienced a 17% reduction in shootings in the first year of the program. Additionally, we find a 14-16% reduction in the years after that, demonstrating the longevity of this change. Interpreted causally, our results imply that around 1,300 shootings were avoided between 2012–2023 due to Cure/CMS.” Once again, the non-police intervention actually saves money. The council’s analysts estimated that “Cure/CMS generated a net social surplus of \$2.45 billion between 2012–2023, achieving a benefit-cost ratio of 6.5:1.”⁸⁸



Reproduced from: NY City Council Cure Violence Study (<https://council.nyc.gov/data/cure/>)

It seems highly plausible that there are lessons here for hate violence reduction; however, it is not obvious how to apply the model to this particular strain of intergroup conflict. City support for more research would be a low-cost, potentially

⁸⁶ Jake Offenhardt, “No new funding for violence interrupter program, despite Adams’ promised expansion,” Gothamist, 2022, (<https://gothamist.com/news/no-new-funding-for-violence-interrupter-program-despite-adams-promised-expansion>)

⁸⁷ <https://council.nyc.gov/data/cure/>

⁸⁸ <https://council.nyc.gov/data/cure/>

high-impact contribution to our understanding of how to proactively reduce identity-based violence.

Additional Recommendations:

- Explore accompaniment programs as an ongoing citywide service ([Main entry: Proactive Prevention](#))
- Provide more support for materials development, translation, and printing ([Main entry: Building The Field](#))
- Hire regional or community-specific program managers ([Main entry: Proactive Prevention](#))



Members of Make the Road NY, NYC Anti-Violence Project, Brooklyn Movement Center, Arab American Association of NY, Jews For Racial & Economic Justice, and others rally for hate violence prevention, 2019

BUILDING THE FIELD

Recommendation: Resource full-time CBO staff.

Perhaps the primary obstacle to a more full-bodied hate violence response is a lack of staff and organizational capacity in the community-based organizations best positioned to be credible and trusted interlocutors in moments of crisis and tension. This is felt acutely in our day to day work, as we desperately want to focus more fully on this critical area. However funding to date (as is often the case in the non-profit funding world) is generally enough to saddle organizations with more responsibility but not enough to increase capacity. We believe one of the most significant interventions the city could make would be to fund organizations at a level that would allow for the hiring of at least one full-time staff coordinator for hate violence prevention with multi-year stability across a large pool of key organizations. In addition, the city should fund more organizations to take on this work in geographic areas and in communities that do not currently have an organization working on violence prevention.

Finally, the city should build substantial capacity in certain key areas such as CBO upstander intervention and de-escalation trainers and youth hate violence prevention so that we can do this work at scale.

Recommendation: Invest in the professional development of hate prevention leaders.

We believe that New York City should be a globally recognized center of excellence and innovation in the prevention of hate violence (and all violence). This requires both a conceptual commitment and a resource commitment. (This also seems like an area where private and foundation partnerships would be strategic and accessible.)

While the city's current coordination of the PATH Forward grantees is a step in the right direction, Zoom calls are not the same as genuine political education and professional development. The city should be investing in growing a pool of professional experts, and in celebrating and showcasing our homegrown leaders in this field via seminars, convenings, and regular interaction with the leaders, researchers, and subject matter experts based here in New York and in other cities and countries.

Trainings and resources that focus on leadership development, and offer organizational support in programmatic (e.g., logic, activities, recruitment), operational (e.g., budget, staffing, legal), and strategic (e.g., board, fundraising, communications) areas, can increase the impact of the city's nonprofit providers. Several city agencies and organizations may help provide such support, such as the Mayor's Office of Nonprofit Services, CUNY's Institute for State and Local Governance, the Support Center for Nonprofit Management, Nonprofit New York, and the New York Council of Nonprofits.

Recommendation: Provide more support for materials development, translation, and printing.

Language access plays a pivotal role in ensuring equitable access to vital services and programs for all New Yorkers, regardless of their language proficiency. In support of all of our proposed initiatives, the city should provide more support for materials development, translation, and printing across the field. This intervention would

support both the ongoing prevention work of NGOs, ensure the approximately 1.8 million residents in NYC with limited English proficiency can access critical safety services, and make it easier for organizations to deploy rapid incident responses. This support can look like:

1. Expanding funding for the Language Justice Collaborative to support training, employment, and recruitment for not only interpreters, but also translators for immigrant communities and further facilitate fast-turnaround access to translation services for CBOs in the hate violence space;
2. Providing flexible, multi-use, and immediately accessible funding to support the cost of translations, multiple rounds of proofreading, designing and printing in-language resources, and developing resource content;



New Yorkers showing support for our call for community-based hate violence prevention, May 2022

3. Establishing an administrative body to hold the city accountable to conducting outreach and creating resources in-language and ensuring better implementation of [LL30](#); and
4. Connecting organizations with relevant competencies to one another for mutual support around language access.

Recommendation: Fully fund and staff the Office for the Prevention of Hate Crimes and NYCCHR.

Finally, the city needs to fully fund and staff the Office for the Prevention of Hate Crimes so that they can be an effective partner and facilitator in this work. OPHC's budget has been held flat at \$500,000

for personnel through at least FY23, with five staff members authorized.^{89,90}

By comparison, as of May 2022, the NYPD Hate Crimes Taskforce had twenty investigators, one civilian, five supervisors, and two co-located state trooper investigators, in addition to the eighteen investigators of the pandemic-era AAPI

89 <https://ny1.com/nyc/all-boroughs/news/2022/05/03/half-of-people-arrested-in-connection-with-a-hate-crime-are-mentally-ill--nypd-officials-say>

90 Testimony by Deanna Logan, Director, Mayor's Office of Criminal Justice, NY City Council Committee on Public Safety, May 2022. (<https://nyc.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.aspx?G=2FD004F1-D85B-4588-A648-0A736C77D6E3&GUID=17A32FA9-802C-4A08-A020-E815DB774EAE&ID=5545736&Options=Advanced&Search>)

hate violence taskforce, plus about twenty-five members of the AAPI community working as translators and doing outreach.⁹¹

It is likely that both OPHC and NYCCHR staff will need to expand to meet the more ambitious goals of this proposal.

Recommendation: Transition OPHC to a Participatory Grantmaking (PGM) model.

When soliciting feedback in the development of this report, a consistent theme among community groups was the desire for community control over funding and strategy. This desire was based on a conviction that this would be by far the most effective, responsive, and values-aligned mechanism for directing the work of OPHC and many of the programs it administers. The violence occurs in our communities; the survivors are in our communities; the violent actors are in our communities; the subject matter experts are at our organizations; the programs are run and services provided through our organizations. This bottom-up [Participatory Grantmaking](#) approach has rapidly become the gold standard for ethical philanthropy at funders such as New York's own [North Star Fund](#) and [Brooklyn.org](#).⁹²

We recommend the establishment of a peer co-governance and participatory grantmaking approval board with nominal authority to make grant awards for most of OPHC's grant making programs. Members would be required to recuse themselves to avoid conflicts of interest. OPHC and the mayor would always have the option of rejecting the board's recommendation regarding an award and accepting any political consequences.

In parallel we recommend the establishment of a community safety advisory body that can partner with OPHC leadership to craft and evolve our intervention strategies, set smart metrics, and affirm our collective values.

In addition to the obvious advantage of having the subjects of a program at the center of shaping and successfully managing it, there is the secondary benefit of distributing responsibility for the success or failure of the program beyond a tiny group of mayoral appointees, and sharing the blame, the credit, and the vision with a diverse cohort of community groups. This is the rare combination of smart policy and smart politics.


What are the implications of this recommendation for current PATH grantees? There are at least two possible ways forward for the current PATH Forward grant model. The first would be to eliminate the anchor organization "hub-and-spoke" model and allow all organizations participating on the participatory grantmaking approval board to vote on all grants. This would increase transparency and allow for consistent standards to be applied across the board. The cost would be a potential dilution of issue area and communal expertise, leading to inappropriate organizations and projects potentially being funded. The alternative would be to keep the current structure, with the peer advisory board voting on anchor



Then-CM Julie Menin showing support for our call for community-based hate violence prevention, May 2022

91 Testimony by Deanna Logan, Director, Mayor's Office of Criminal Justice, NY City Council Committee on Public Safety, May 2022. (<https://nyc.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.aspx?G=2FD004F1-D85B-4588-A648-0A736C77D6E3&GUID=17A32FA9-802C-4A08-A020-E815DB774EAE&ID=5545736&Options=Advanced&Search>)

92 <https://nonprofitquarterly.org/participatory-grantmaking-what-practitioners-have-to-say/> (Further reading on PGM: https://www.fordfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/participatory_grantmaking-lmv7.pdf; <https://brooklyn.org/article/participatory-grantmaking-in-action-what-it-takes/>; <https://fundhumanrights.org/commentary/fund-101-what-is-participatory-grantmaking/>)



organization awards, new anchors, and additional grantees. This would create the most seamless continuity with the current program and preserve specialized expertise, at the cost of a more complex program that may be harder for new organizations to directly access. We believe this implementation decision should be made by the participatory grantmaking advisory committee and other PATH grantees, in consultation with OPHC staff during an initial implementation phase.

Recommendation: Create a social worker pool for smaller CBOs.

While some organizations in this space do both community organizing and human service provision, there are many who do not have the necessary resources or are not primarily focused on services. However it is very common for community members to contact these smaller CBOs because they or a loved one have experienced an incident of identity-based violence or another traumatic event.

In these moments smaller CBOs are often unable to provide the skilled, specialized, trauma-informed care that survivors need in moments of crisis, and there is often not another appropriate, trusted organization to whom we can refer people in crisis.

We recommend the creation of a small shared pool of social workers who are kept on retainer and are able to respond at short notice to provide counseling and referral to additional services to survivors, their families and loved ones. In addition they can provide specialized guidance to local leaders and OPHC staff on how to best engage and care for the many indirectly-impacted community members, eyewitnesses, and anxious members of the public who deserve help in the aftermath of an ugly incident of identity-based violence. These social workers can also be trained to be horizontal links across CBOs, helping the public to navigate services and available communities.

When not responding to calls, this unique pool can engage in peer-education, skill sharing, collective research, and other activities to continue sharpening the analysis and application of the social work toolkit to the particular challenges of providing culturally competent trauma-informed care (CCTIC) to hate violence survivors and targets. And they can be one node in a continuum of care and guidance for prevention practitioners and program staff who understandably also need emotional support. This is another opportunity for New York City to become a global leader in hate violence prevention under this administration.

Currently there are a series of challenges with contracting social workers due to [SIFI certification](#) requirements not aligning with reasonable social worker salaries



Jews Against Islamophobia rally (with then-CM Brad Lander), 2018

(with the situation only worsened if you want to hire someone bilingual). The city should look at requirements and at the way it assesses social worker pay in both the hate violence space and in other human service provision areas.

Safety in Solidarity rally
after Monsey, NY attack.
December, 2019.
Photo by Gili Getz



HYPERLOCAL CULTURAL COMPETENCY AND ANTI-BIAS EDUCATION

Recommendation: Increase funding and support for the development of diversity education and anti-bias curricula.

One of the key principles that animates our model of community-based hate violence prevention is that intergroup hostility and alienation increase in inverse proportion to the amount that groups know about each other's cultures, history, and current struggles. This is why Jews For Racial & Economic Justice has placed such a significant emphasis on antisemitism education as a core strategy.

Research consistently shows that multicultural education using curricula that integrate diverse cultural histories, perspectives, and lived experiences can improve intergroup relations by reducing prejudice, fostering empathy, and strengthening peer relationships. For example, according to 2023 research by Ceren Abacioglu, Sacha Epskamp, Agneta Fischer & Monique Volman, classrooms that intentionally include “content integration,” “prejudice reduction,” and “equity pedagogy” promote more positive peer relations, which in turn enhance students’ emotional and behavioral engagement.⁹³

These findings are robust. A 2021 meta-analysis by Elizabeth Paluck, Roni Porat, Chelsey Clark and Donald Green systematically compared different types of prejudice-reduction interventions and found that programs involving active engagement, dialogue, and intergroup contact consistently outperform purely informational ones.⁹⁴

These results are bolstered by research by Muniba Saleem, Grace S. Yang, and Srividya Ramasubramanian which showed that structured contact between groups can help to reverse the effects of, and potentially inoculate groups against, harmful stereotypes. The research team's two studies compared the impact of relying on the media for information about Muslims to the impact of direct contact between groups. The studies found (unsurprisingly) that “reliance on media for information about Muslims was positively associated with stereotypic beliefs, negative emotions, and support for harmful policies. Reliance on direct contact for information about Muslims produced the opposite results. Results from a three-wave longitudinal design revealed that reliance on media and direct contact significantly predict changes in negative emotions which then predict changes in support for civil restrictions for Muslim Americans.”⁹⁵

Taken together, this research highlights that interventions grounded in Allport's Contact Hypothesis (discussed earlier) produce larger and more reliable effects on reducing prejudice and improving intergroup attitudes. They write that “enduring changes in prejudice are most often observed when interventions alter social norms, promote sustained contact, or engage participants in critical reflection

93 Abacioglu, C.S., Epskamp, S., Fischer, A.H. et al. Effects of multicultural education on student engagement in low- and high-concentration classrooms: the mediating role of student relationships. *Learning Environ Res* 26, 951–975 (2023). <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10984-023-09462-0>

94 Paluck, E. L., Porat, R., Clark, C. S., & Green, D. P. (2021). Prejudice Reduction: Progress and Challenges. *Annual review of psychology*, 72, 533-560. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-071620-030619>

95 Saleem, M., Yang, G.S. and Ramasubramanian, S. (2016), Reliance on Direct and Mediated Contact and Public Policies Supporting Outgroup Harm. *J Commun*, 66: 604-624. <https://doi.org/10.1111/jcom.12234>

rather than relying solely on information provision” (Paluck et al., 2021, Annual Review of Psychology).⁹⁶

The city should increase and expand resourcing for the participatory development of age-appropriate, culturally-competent diversity education curricula (such as JFREJ’s *Understand Antisemitism* guide and curriculum materials) specifically tailored to the New York demographic landscape. Community groups should be supported to add to a library of educational materials developed “for us, by us.”

These materials will then be used, among other things, to support the program of shared intergroup projects detailed above so that as communities form bonds and trust from working together, their curiosity and willingness to absorb information about each other primes them for successful concurrent diversity education efforts.

Recommendation: Implement a “whole of government” approach to anti-bias education.

In addition, the city should explore ways to leverage existing cultural events and activities (such as street fairs, holiday events and parades, and public film series) to be sites of multicultural education while proactively working with community leaders, trusted organizations, and credible messengers to ensure that the community members who would most benefit from this education show up to get it.

OPHC can coordinate a “whole of government” (W.o.G.) approach to address relations between key groups that piggybacks anti-bias education onto any appropriate existing program in a manner that is smart and targeted. This tactic can be proactive, to reduce *defensive* violence, and it can also be used as a form of rapid or medium-term incident response to reduce *retaliatory* violence — when a bias incident occurs, moving quickly to create very public and well publicized opportunities for communities to learn about and celebrate each other has the potential to interrupt the spread of stereotypes and misinformation. And engaging artists and other cultural workers will increase the number of learning modalities available to community members, many of whom may not be ready to sign up for a two-hour training in their spare time, but might be moved by a new public mural or be happy to watch a short film at an exciting local event or attend a “food truck summit” representing impacted communities.

The city can continue to deepen integration with [COMPASS](#) (DYCD), [Summer Rising](#) (DYCD + DOE), [MAP](#) & NeighborhoodStat, [Atlas](#), and [OPGV](#).

This is also responsive to the language of Int 0586-2026, which requires “the New York City Commission on Human Rights (CCHR) to coordinate with the Office for the Prevention of Hate Crimes, the Office of Ethnic and Community Media, other relevant agencies, and community groups to conduct annual public education campaigns to combat antisemitism, raise awareness of the contributions of Jewish New Yorkers to the City, and promote inclusion, equity, and understanding. Campaigns would occur every year during Jewish American Heritage Month, or other appropriate month selected by CCHR, and would use diverse forms of media and emphasize youth education.”

⁹⁶ Paluck, E. L., Porat, R., Clark, C. S., & Green, D. P. (2021). Prejudice Reduction: Progress and Challenges. Annual review of psychology, 72, 533-560. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-071620-030619>

ADDITIONAL POLICY INTERVENTIONS

Recommendation: Physical infrastructure for public safety.

Research shows that improving neighborhood infrastructure can make communities safer. In Philadelphia, a city program that repaired more than 13,000 homes found a 22% drop in overall crime on those blocks. Violent crimes also went down: assaults fell by about 19% and robberies by about 23%.⁹⁷ According to the authors, “This study found that the BSRP intervention was associated with a modest but significant reduction in crime. These findings suggest that intentional and targeted financial investment in structural, scalable, and sustainable place-based interventions in neighborhoods that are still experiencing the lasting consequences of structural racism and segregation is a vital step toward achieving health equity.”⁹⁸

Another study of 301 U.S. cities found that neighborhoods with more and better-kept green spaces, such as trees, parks, and open areas with clear visibility, had significantly lower rates of violent crime.⁹⁹

Investing in housing repairs and green spaces doesn’t just make neighborhoods look better — it also helps people feel safer and can reduce violence and property crime in measurable ways. There is no obvious reason why the same interventions that reduce other categories of crime shouldn’t work for hate crimes and bias incidents. The city should study the efficacy of these programs in reducing identity-based violence. The city could use the predictive mapping project detailed in Proactive Prevention to identify potential pilot sites and use the proposed survey program (Reinventing Reporting) to collect data.

Recommendation: Expand mental healthcare access and create best practices for provider intervention.

The link between mental health and hate violence is poorly understood.

At a Council oversight hearing in May 2022, NYPD Hate Crimes Task Force leadership told Council members that of the roughly 100 people arrested in connection with hate crimes in NYC that year, 47 had prior documentation as an “Emotionally Disturbed Person (EDP)” in NYPD records.¹⁰⁰ These were arrests where police had previously categorized the individual in an EDP incident, which NYPD uses as a field designation for someone who appears mentally ill. The NYPD does not systematically track whether mentally ill arrestees receive treatment post-arrest.

We do not believe this data should be interpreted as demonstrating a direct correlation between mental illness and hate violence. On the contrary, the connection is nuanced and the causality is entirely unclear. In “The Conundrums of Hate Crime Prevention,” Stanford University’s Shirin Sinnar explains, “there is, in fact, little empirical research on the relationship between hate crime perpetrators

97 South EC, MacDonald J, Reina V. Association Between Structural Housing Repairs for Low-Income Homeowners and Neighborhood Crime. *JAMA Netw Open*. 2021 Jul 1;4(7):e2117067. doi: 10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2021.17067. PMID: 34287632; PMCID: PMC9435958.

98 South EC, MacDonald J, Reina V. Association Between Structural Housing Repairs for Low-Income Homeowners and Neighborhood Crime. *JAMA Netw Open*. 2021 Jul 1;4(7):e2117067. doi: 10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2021.17067. PMID: 34287632; PMCID: PMC9435958.

99 S. Scott Ogletree, Lincoln R. Larson, Robert B. Powell, David L. White, Matthew T.J. Brownlee, Urban greenspace linked to lower crime risk across 301 major U.S. cities; *Cities*, Volume 131, 2022, 103949, ISSN 0264-2751; <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2022.103949>.

100 A. Venugopal, *Nearly half of those arrested in hate crime attacks had mental health issues: NYPD*, *Gothamist*, May 4, 2022; <https://gothamist.com/news/most-subway-crime-attributed-to->

Case Study: Restorative Justice at CJJ

Take the following criminal case where, with the consent of all the parties, the Center for Justice Innovation (CJI) implemented a restorative justice response. A man walking the streets of New York City is brutally attacked and beaten. The unprovoked assault is captured on surveillance footage.

The victim spends a week in the hospital. He also suffers from significant psychological distress. His life feels like it was destabilized in an instant, he says, and he is full of unanswered questions. From the outset, he is also clear that, for him, justice cannot be achieved through incarceration. Like many other victims, he wants instead to understand why this happened, and to ensure it will not happen again to someone else.

Through the restorative justice process, the parties meet face-to-face. The victim brings his close friend and the responsible party brings his wife. The victim shares how the incident has impacted his life and is able to let go of his fears that he had been targeted for his identity. The responsible party expresses remorse, shares about his use of alcohol which was a driving factor in the assault, and commits to addressing his substance use. The supporters share how they too have been impacted by the harm. They provide insight into the lives and characters of their loved ones. Together, all agree that the responsible party will enroll in outpatient treatment for substance use.

As a result of the restorative process, not only did the responsible party avoid incarceration and the negative consequences that often result from it, he took steps to address the underlying issues driving his behavior. The victim expressed that the process was an important part of his healing journey. The relief and empowerment this victim experienced, along with the commitment made by the responsible party to both him and to those who loved him, could never have been realized within the traditional legal system.

Violence requires a response that opens opportunities for a different future, not a doubling down on the very conditions that make it more likely to occur. We owe it to victims to tend to their needs, make amends where possible, and have a justice process that supports their long-term healing and safety.

and actual mental illness. Some studies describe the number of people with mental illness in a given population of hate crime offenders, but without making a comparison to the proportion of the general population struggling with mental illness, or without explaining the basis for such a comparison. In addition, it is difficult to draw conclusions from cases where hate crime perpetrators had treatment for mental health prior to committing the crime, because the direction of causation can be unclear: is a person's preexisting mental illness contributing to their violence or is a person's prior expressions of interest in violence leading to referrals to mental health care?"¹⁰¹

In addition, all of the relevant research shows that mental illness doesn't make you more likely to commit a crime. According to the National Alliance on Mental Illness, "Most people with serious mental illness are not violent towards others. In fact, only 4% of violent acts in the U.S. are associated with serious mental illness. People with mental illness are more often victims of violence than the cause of violence. Studies have shown that people with mental illness are 23 times more likely to be victims of a violent crime than others."¹⁰²

One conclusion we believe can be drawn at this time is that the current mayoral administration's intention to expand access to high-quality mental healthcare is laudable and of the highest priority. When we look at both the vulnerability of people with mental illness to violence, and the value of mental healthcare as one element of a care-based strategy targeting a basket of criminogenic comorbidities, expanded mental healthcare

The Study Of Terrorism & Responses To Terrorism, Characteristics And Targets Of Mass Casualty Hate Crime Offenders 1 (2020), (finding that 14.4.% of "[n]on-[m]ass [c]asualty [v]iolent [o]ffenders" in Bias Incidents and Actors Study had mental illness, compared to 35.2% of mass casualty offenders, defined as those who "perpetrated, or attempted to perpetrate, an attack with the intention of killing or injuring four or more people"); Sinnar also cites: Edward Dunbar, Symbolic, Relational, and Ideological Signifiers of Bias-Motivated Offenders: Toward a Strategy of Assessment, 73 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 203, 205, 207 (2003) (observing that nearly 1 in 4 of 58 convicted hate crime offenders in Los Angeles County from 1995–1997 had a history of psychiatric treatment prior to the hate crime, without offering a comparison to the general population). Sinnar points out that "Comparisons of rates of mental illness among hate crime offenders and in the general population can also be problematic when the measures of mental illness are not identical."

¹⁰² <https://www.nami.org/advocacy/policy-priorities/responding-to-crises/extreme-risk-protection-orders/>

access should be considered a critical violence reduction effort that will benefit all New Yorkers regardless of whether they are directly accessing services.

Second, this is further evidence that our crude existing approach of ascribing monocausal motivations to violence is muddying the waters more than it is illuminating the problem, and is another argument for supplanting reporting with surveys and other strategies for assessing social cohesion and public safety. (*Main entry: Reinventing Reporting*)

That said, where appropriate, MOCJ should look at systematizing data collection with regard to mental health and hate violence and consider working with researchers to better understand the link between identity-based violence and mental health.

In addition, we recommend that OPHC work with CBOs and mental health experts to develop training, guidance, and best practices for health care providers working in targeted communities or with individuals they assess to be at increased risk of causing identity-based harm that does not rise to the level of physical violence or criminality. This effort can be integrated with our recommended Social Worker Pool. (*Main entry: Building The Field*)

Recommendation: Increase utilization and resourcing for Restorative Justice.

Restorative Justice (RJ) can be a powerful tool for addressing wrongdoing and preventing future harm. It requires perpetrators to take meaningful accountability and allows survivors far more closure and opportunity for healing than is available through traditional criminal legal practices.

According to the Center for Justice Innovation (CJI):

“[T]he response seeks to decrease isolation where responsible parties have the opportunity to face the impact of their actions and take steps to make amends. The goal is the transformation of shame into accountability. Simultaneously, restorative responses explicitly offer care to victims based on the needs they have identified. In short, rather than just a change in the type of sanction or supervision someone receives, restorative justice is a different pathway to justice. A restorative approach significantly alters the experiences of everyone in the aftermath of a crime: those who were harmed, those who committed the harm, and their respective loved ones are invited into the process—the latter generally accorded little formal role in a traditional justice system response.”

While some pretrial cases where identity-based violence was a factor have been referred to RJ processes (primarily by the Manhattan DA), the practice is underutilized, both in the criminal legal system and at the community level.

We agree with Mayor Mamdani’s Department of Community Safety proposal to: “restart the process to finalize contracts with community-based organizations to

lead and develop restorative justice programs to combat hate violence cases, begun in 2021”

The Center for Justice Innovation, a leader in this work, has piloted RJ in the context of cases involving hate violence, incorporating diversity and anti-bias education components into RJ practice.

While DA offices have referred some misdemeanor cases where hate violence is a contributing factor to the crime, we recommend pushing DAs to increase the number of case referrals and refer more serious crimes. By expanding these referrals, we provide more harmed parties the opportunity to receive meaningful accountability and allow responsible parties the ability to reflect on their motivations.

In addition, for RJ to be successful, many more CBOs need to be trained in RJ processes designed to interrupt cycles of ignorance, bias, or discrimination. With dedicated trained facilitators, CBOs can partner with other practitioners and even lead their own processes.

Remember that this praxis goes far beyond criminal cases. If we want communities to engage in difficult conversations across differences, harm will occur as part of that process. In addition, there are many situations in which community members will cause harm to one another that does not rise to the level of criminality, or where the harmed parties have no interest in involving the criminal legal system. RJ should be considered a necessary backstop for all of the other strategies we have outlined in this report.

The city should facilitate and resource RJ training for CBO staff as well as stipending community members to be trained in RJ, along with encouraging far more pretrial referrals to RJ for hate crimes cases and cases involving hate violence. In addition, the city and CBOs should work to spread awareness of RJ as a tool that New Yorkers can access and consider resourcing RJ as an “on-demand” service available to community members so that they can address incidents of harm proactively, without involving the criminal legal system.

Finally, OPHC should work with CBOs to further develop diversity training resources tailored to RJ work and integrate these resources into HV-specific Restorative Justice processes.

Recommendation: Fund empowerment-based self-defense training.

New York City should invest in empowerment-based self-defense and community organizing programs as a key strategy for preventing hate violence. Evidence-based self-defense training equips participants with practical skills to recognize risk, de-escalate threatening situations, and respond to violence when necessary, while also strengthening confidence, collective efficacy, and community resilience.

In New York City, Malikah provides a leading model for this work. Malikah is a Muslim women-led anti-violence organization based in Queens that builds power and safety through self-defense education, organizing, financial literacy, and healing programs. Malikah’s work focuses specifically on addressing the intersection of gender-based violence and hate violence impacting Muslim women and girls, who often experience gendered Islamophobia in public spaces, workplaces, schools, and on public transit. Malikah is currently the only Muslim women-led organization in

New York City primarily dedicated to addressing hate-based violence as it impacts Muslim women.

Empowerment-based self-defense programs have a strong evidence base in violence prevention. A randomized controlled trial involving 893 women across five universities, published in the *New England Journal of Medicine* and followed by a 2023 analysis, found that participants who received self-defense training experienced a 57.3% reduction in sexual assault compared to those who did not receive the training.^{103,104} Similarly, a study of nearly 2,000 adolescent girls in Nairobi found an approximately 38% reduction in sexual assault among participants over a one-year period.¹⁰⁵ Participants in both studies also reported increased confidence, situational awareness, and preparedness in potentially dangerous situations. These findings suggest that empowerment-based self-defense training can be a powerful preventive intervention, particularly when paired with community education and organizing.

Given the documented rise in Islamophobia and hate-based harassment in New York City, the City should prioritize partnerships with trusted, community-rooted organizations with demonstrated expertise in culturally competent safety training. is uniquely positioned to lead and scale this work across New York City due to its deep relationships with Muslim communities, strong coalitions, existing work with NYC schools and CUNY and its 17 years of focus on gendered hate violence prevention.

Program Priorities

- School-Based Safety Education
- Fund Malukah to provide empowerment-based self-defense, bystander intervention, and de-escalation trainings in NYC public schools and CUNY campuses, with a focus on preventing gender-based violence and hate-based harassment.
- Community Safety Trainings in Religious and Cultural Spaces
- Support Malukah to deliver self-defense and safety workshops in mosques, community centers, immigrant-serving organizations, and cultural institutions across the city.
- Joint Islamophobia and Antisemitism Prevention Trainings (which we already do)
- Invest in cross-community trainings addressing both Islamophobia and antisemitism, focused on solidarity, bystander intervention, and

103 Senn CY, Eliasziw M, Barata PC, Thurston WE, Newby-Clark IR, Radtke HL, Hobden KL. Efficacy of a sexual assault resistance program for university women. *N Engl J Med*. 2015 Jun 11;372(24):2326-35. doi: 10.1056/NEJMsa1411131. PMID: 26061837.

104 Senn CY, Hobden KL, Eliasziw M, Barata PC, Radtke HL, McVey GL, Thurston WE. Testing the effectiveness of a sexual assault resistance programme in 'real-world' implementation. *Eur J Psychotraumatol*. 2023;14(2):2290859. doi: 10.1080/2008066.2023.2290859. Epub 2023 Dec 18. PMID: 38109360; PMCID: PMC10732193.

105 Sarnquist C, Omondi B, Sinclair J, Gitau C, Paiva L, Mulinge M, Cornfield DN, Maldonado Y. Rape prevention through empowerment of adolescent girls. *Pediatrics*. 2014 May;133(5):e1226-32. doi: 10.1542/peds.2013-3414. Epub 2014 Apr 14. PMID: 24733880.

community-based safety strategies.

- Targeted Outreach to Muslim Women Experiencing Gendered Islamophobia
- Expand safety programs specifically designed for Muslim women and girls, including those who are visibly Muslim and experience disproportionate levels of harassment in public spaces.

Recommendation: Fully-fund SYEP.

One of New York’s most successful efforts in recent years is the Summer Youth Employment Program (SYEP). As described by the city’s Department of Youth and Community Development, “The Summer Youth Employment Program (SYEP) is the nation’s largest youth employment program, connecting NYC youth between the ages of 14 and 24 with career exploration opportunities and paid work experience each summer. Participants have the opportunity to explore their interests and career pathways, develop workplace skills and engage in learning experiences that help in developing their social, civic and leadership skills. By participating in structured project- and work-based opportunities, NYC youth are better prepared for careers of the future.”

These are unalloyed goods in themselves, however multiple studies have shown that SYEP programs have a major impact on crime. Young people who participate in SYEP programs have markedly lower arrest rates for all crime, but the numbers for violent crime are huge (as much as 30%–45%). Participants also have 30%–35% fewer arraignments for property and violent crimes and are 38% less likely to be convicted of a felony.¹⁰⁶

SYEP is a perfect example of a program that is far more effective than policing at reducing crime, and alleviates multiple other social harms for a fraction of the cost of a police officer or jail cell. It is thus emblematic of New York’s incoherent public safety policies that this program has not historically been funded at a level adequate to meet the demand for jobs. Fully funding SYEP is an obvious step toward reducing violence and crime of all kinds in New York City.

The city could also look at integrating de-escalation and anti-bias trainings into SYEP as an optional elective offering or a required prerequisite for participation in the program, which would be a straightforward way to disseminate these critical skills and perspectives into a key, hard to reach age cohort.

Recommendation: Lower barriers to accessing victims services.

A consistent theme that we have heard for years is that for survivors of hate crimes there are significant barriers to accessing state OVS victims services, primarily because these services require a police report to have been filed, or require victims to go into a police precinct, or otherwise interact with the NYPD. The city should coordinate with New York State to create an easy-to-navigate alternative certification system that allows survivors of hate crimes to access the full range of

¹⁰⁶ Via Crime-Fighting Lessons from Summer Youth Employment Programs by Charles Fain Lehman; Gelber, Isen, and Kessler, “The Effects of Youth Employment”; Sara B. Heller, “Summer Jobs Reduce Violence Among Disadvantaged Youth,” *Science* 346, no. 6214 (Dec. 5, 2014): 1219–23; Alicia Sasser Modestino, “How Do Summer Youth Employment Programs Improve Criminal Justice Outcomes, and for Whom?” *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management* 38, no. 3 (Summer 2019): 600–628; Davis and Heller, “Rethinking the Benefits of Youth Employment Programs”; Judd Kessler et al., “The Effects of Youth Employment on Crime: Evidence from New York City Lotteries,” working paper 28373, NBER, January 2021; Heller, “When Scale and Replication Work.”

OVS services to which they are entitled without police interaction. As with other alternative channels, this can only improve reporting as well as connecting more New Yorkers to the important assistance they should receive.

Recommendation: Improve and fully fund victims services.

We agree with the [DCS planning document](#) which identifies these current gaps:

- 55,000+ New Yorkers annually seek services from Safe Horizon
- Adams 2025 budget cut \$3M from Safe Horizon
- 16.7% of New Yorkers affected by intimate partner violence (IPV)
- 412 human trafficking cases in 2023 affecting 845 victims (62% sex trafficking, 1% labor trafficking, 23% both)
- Many cases unreported, especially among undocumented immigrants and trans women
- Only 29% of crime victims and 37% of violent crime victims receive mental health support

and recommends the following improvements:

- Review and expand Office of Crime Victim Services programming
 - Better coordinate services, particularly housing options and comprehensive supports for sexual violence survivors
 - Leverage existing Family Justice Center network
- Connect Safe Horizon to CMS system and double its funding
- Double funding for other crime victim assistance programs¹⁰⁷

Recommendation: Increase public awareness of Safe Horizon.

Given how underreported hate violence is, it is likely that many survivors never even know about Safe Horizon and the offerings they can take advantage of. If we are going to move beyond the NYPD as the primary response to hate violence, we can't rely on the NYPD to communicate to survivors about their rights and the services available to them. the city should find new ways to get the word out about Safe Horizon and other victims services.

¹⁰⁷ <https://docs.google.com/document/d/1a7ejjSZWWIAcxfcWnkYaqvnjihTb0LAOQkj8g10-npg/edit?tab=t.0#heading=h.yyrhu7ml5bea>

BUDGET & IMPLEMENTATION

There are limits to what we can say with regard to implementation at this point. We defer to the mayor's office to structure its agencies and interagency process as it sees fit. And the proposal emphasizes a community-involved, participatory decision-making process that largely precludes us from insisting upon any particular structure. However there are some elements of the proposal that clearly suggest structures and possible approaches and we can lay those out. We have also attempted to provide grounded cost estimates for most of the recommendations included in this report (see page 74). In some cases, an accurate estimate is not practical. In these cases we have included a nominal figure as a starting point for piloting and evaluating demand and cost as the program is implemented and evolves. Finally, our recommendations are almost entirely budgetary, at the city level, and do not require new regulations or legislation, although they could be realized via legislation.

Our implementation suggestions are organized by recommendation below.

Invest in non-police reporting of hate crimes and bias incidents.

Our current proposal budgets for two additional CBOs to begin operating 24/7 hotlines. It would be the responsibility of the CBOs to publicize the hotlines, however OPHC and DCLA can help with targeted PSA advertising. CBOs would make grant applications to OPHC for funding, which would be evaluated by OPHC staff and the peer grantmaking committee. These hotlines would be in addition to 311 and the hotline based at CCHR proposed by CM Lincoln Restler (Int 0388-2026).

Supplement or supplant voluntary reporting and hate crimes data with surveys.

This proposal budgets for approximately seven neighborhood-based surveys per year, based on estimates provided by CUNY Public Science Project. OPHC should solicit bids and contract with an appropriate entity to do the data collection and analysis. CBOs and other partners should be included in the process of determining types of data to be collected, as well as providing cultural competency for the researchers.

Consider contracting out data integration and management.

The city should put out an RFP to investigate whether integration and analysis of data provided by CBOs, NYPD, CCHR, and other entities could be better and more cheaply done by a third-party

Intergroup Collaborative Projects (ICPs) - Use collaborative organizing projects to build intergroup relationships; hire regional or community-specific program managers.

A significant portion of the budget (\$6.12 million) is set aside for Regional Program Managers. At the community level, regional program managers and CBOs implement programming — such as Intergroup Communal Project, de-escalation trainings, rapid response, education, hotlines, and accompaniment — directly serving New Yorkers. The overall structure is a hub-and-spoke model combining

centralized strategy and data coordination with decentralized, community-based implementation.

There are a number of ways the city could approach funding these positions. The plan currently proposes a 51-member workforce with a program manager for each council district. This is a simple, logical way to distribute resources that allows for transparent political accountability, democratic oversight of the program, and buy-in from elected officials. However there are clearly other ways to divide up the city and allocate staff. The City Council or OPHC, in partnership with CBOs on a governance committee, could choose a different scheme for program manager staffing.

The plan assumes that in most cases program managers will be housed at relevant local CBOs. However in some cases there may be no appropriate CBO in a neighborhood to hold this work. In these cases the program manager could be housed at a citywide non-profit, or even within a councilmember's district office. In addition, some program managers need not be geographically based. For example, it could make sense to have citywide program managers for the LGBTQ community or for immigrants, etc.

A field program for hate violence prevention.

This proposal budgets \$20,000 per group for up to 70 organizations to cover program costs related to deep canvassing or other hate violence prevention field operations. These programs can be encouraged by OPHC, which can help to facilitate training and skill sharing for interested CBOs, as well as assisting the disseminating of contact information gleaned from canvassing to program managers for further outreach. This kind of work will not be of interest or appropriate for all CBOs. CBOs would make grant applications to OPHC for funding, which would be evaluated by OPHC staff and the peer grantmaking committee.

Implement a media monitoring program combined with up-to-date demographic data for predictive mapping of potential identity-based conflict.

This proposal includes a notional budget of \$300,000 for this program. OPHC should solicit bids and contract with an appropriate university or NGO entity to do the media monitoring and analysis. CBOs and other partners should be included in the process of determining types of data to be collected, as well as providing cultural competency for the researchers. Contract terms, data retention and privacy policies, and deliverables would be set by a council of CBOs and civil liberties groups, organized by OPHC.

Scale and set ambitious metrics for de-escalation (upstander) training; Diffuse de-escalation and upstander skills spatially in current and predicted future hotspots.

Another large (\$8.1 million) item is the budget for de-escalation training. This estimate is based directly on the Center for Anti-Violence Education's current demand for workshops and its breakeven cost for providing training (which we

take to be representative of the field), scaled up to include 70 CBOs doing regular workshops (approximately 38 per year per organization).

Budget for more (and more responsive) PSA advertising; shift the content of HV prevention messaging.

We include \$1.623 million in our proposal for public advertising, given its ability to reach many more New Yorkers than can be served by programs alone, and to reach people who would otherwise not be legible to CBOs and government agencies. This figure is based on:

- 500 subway in-car cards: $500 \times (\$75\text{--}\$150) \approx \$37,500\text{--}\$75,000$ (plus print/installation) Blue Line Media (<https://www.bluelinemedia.com/train-rail-advertising>)
- \$57k for 500 cards x 4 weeks at median price; \$228k for 500 cards @ 16 weeks/year 50 bus shelters: $50 \times (\$1,300\text{--}\$6,500) \approx \$65,000\text{--}\$325,000$ (<https://www.bluelinemedia.com/bus-advertising/new-york-city-ny>)
- \$455,000 for 100 shelters x 4 weeks at median price; \$1,365,000 for 100 shelters for 12 weeks
- \$30k overhead for art, design, and project management

We have proposed that CBOs work with OPHC to set overall prevention strategy and set yearly metrics and this advertising would be responsive to that strategic plan. Some advertising would be to communicate key information and “ethos” messages that all New Yorkers should hear. Other campaigns could focus on local areas to promote specific programs or reinforce targeted messaging. And some funds could be kept in reserve so that the city can respond to a major incident or emerging opportunity. Content guidelines should be drafted by OPHC in partnership with key partners, other agencies, and experts.

Explore a hotline for real-time support in moments of crisis.

We budget \$2.9 million annually for a Realtime Assistance Hotline. This is based on two lines, plus one supervisor and one social worker, fully-staffed 24/7/365 plus overhead for contingencies and program management using industry standard rates.

- Direct staffing: \$546,000 (using a relief factor of 5.2 @ \$70,000/year plus fringe benefits (total = \$105,000/year per FTE)
- Night differential: \$6,000
- Overtime cushion: \$55,000 Management allocation: \$75,000
- Plus a \$43,000 overage for a per-seat total of \$725,000
- The best approach for translation services is yet to be determined. Tools like Convey911 or Prepared AI may be contracted, or the hotline may plug into the 911 or DOH systems for translation, or find another solution. This area may be underbudgeted, however we do request \$100,000 for general translation services below, which may be utilized.

This structure assumes an incidence rate higher than our current reporting system, but not astronomical, with relatively few simultaneous calls. Due to the real-time

nature of the hotline, we believe having “backup” for the operator in the form of a social worker and a manager is a necessary component of the program. All staff will need to be well-trained in de-escalation as well as other safety procedures, including those specific to public transportation. In addition, they will need to be well integrated into the community of CBOs and agencies that provide related services. Guidelines for response will need to be set by OPHC and experts, and reviewed by corporation counsel and other legal authorities, as well as by operators in the 911 and 311 systems and/or other experienced hotline operators for best practices. After a year of operation, we can assess capacity needs and budget.

Explore accompaniment programs as an ongoing citywide service.

The CBO governance committee and OPHC staff should work with interested CBOs to design pilot programs for further iterative assessment and experimentation. We have included \$1.74 million which would allow a variety of program designs to be tested. As a baseline, this would allow twelve organizations to run pilot programs, with

- one program manager/evaluator (\$120k per full time position)
- one dedicated staff member for each program (\$120k per full time position)
- volunteer support, materials, stipends (\$15k per program for smaller items)

However this could also look like one organization running programs in multiple service areas, or one large program running in a pilot region. Alternatively, OPHC and the governance committee could decide to put out an RFP for a corporate partner to provide services. This is a decision to be made during the overall strategy-setting process.

Building The Field.

In the “Building The Field” area, a number of smaller amounts are set aside for CBO and agency staff to attend trainings, conferences, and other skill building programs (\$411,000). This would allow each of the program managers to access \$1000, as well as reserving \$10,000 specifically for travel expenses. However these funds could be disbursed differently based on need, at OPHC discretion.

We also request funding for practitioner **convenings** and meetings to further support skill building, diffusion of best practices, interfacing with community members, other agencies, and NGOs. The \$140,000 requested would allow for 3 quarterly convenings plus a single larger annual event, plus a single subject-specific event (which could cover tactics like deep canvassing, or a deep dive into an area like antisemitism for the full prevention community).

We also set a nominal amount (\$100,000) for additional **language support** for all program activities. This can cover either grants to CBOs, reimbursements to other agencies, or direct support to OPHC programs.

We have put in \$425,000 to support the development of **diversity education and anti-bias curricula and programming**. This would allow \$35,000 each for

10 new curricula and programs annually, as well as providing \$75,000 for Special Education and other specialized needs.

We envision **Rapid Incident Response** being coordinated by regional program managers with support from OPHC staff, in contact with local leaders, religious institutions, CBOs, and community members.

With regard to further **resourcing CBOs**, the funding for regional program managers largely replaces the current **PATH grants**. However the proposal recognizes that not all CBOs will house program managers, or even want full time positions funded, and yet still may have staffing needs, and provides \$3.4 million in additional grants for capacity building at CBOs as well as to cover OPHC's existing **Community Project Grants** program.

In terms of transitioning from the current PATH structure, there are at least two possible "paths forward." The first would be to eliminate the anchor organization "hub-and-spoke" model and allow all organizations participating on the participatory grantmaking approval board to vote on all grants. This would increase transparency and allow for consistent standards to be applied across the board. The cost would be a potential dilution of issue area and communal expertise, leading to inappropriate organizations and projects potentially being funded. The alternative would be to keep the current structure, with the peer advisory board voting on anchor organization awards, new anchors, and additional grantees. This would create the most seamless continuity with the current program and preserve specialized expertise, at the cost of a more complex program that may be harder for new organizations to directly access. We believe this implementation decision should be made by the participatory grantmaking advisory committee and other PATH grantees, in consultation with OPHC staff during an initial implementation phase.

Agency and other funding.

Agency funding and other city programs are not included in our program budget however we will discuss these items briefly here.

SYEP was funded at \$236M by the Adams administration. That covers 100,000 youth jobs. However demand was estimated by the Adams administration at 250,000 in 2021. This suggests that around \$594 million would meet demand.

OPHC is currently funded at \$500,000. Given the expansion of OPHC's work proposed here, it is easy to imagine that a doubling of staff could be required. We defer to OPHC and MPCJ to set their own staffing based on need. However we will include an increase of \$500,000 here as a placeholder, bringing the total to \$1 million.

Safe Horizon is funded through state, federal, and city grants. Mayor Mamdani has pledged to restore \$2.6 million in city funding in the FY27 budget. We are not in a position to estimate Safe Horizon funding as this would be driven by increased future demand, which will take more accumulated data to assess. However, given that successful implementation of the proposals in this report will increase demand for Crime Victim Assistance programs, the council should consider Safe Horizon's current funding as a baseline to build upon.

According to the NY Bar Association, in FY24 **NYCCHR** received a record 12,190 discrimination inquiries from the public but was only able to resolve 471 cases. The

waiting time for an intake appointment averages six months.”¹⁰⁸ This is because the Commission’s Law Enforcement Bureau had lost 34 staff attorneys as of March 2024 — a 73% downsizing of that team. CCHR’s FY25 budget was \$13.6 million. In FY26 that increased to \$14.9 million.¹⁰⁹ However this is still less than the estimated \$3 million necessary to restore the Law Enforcement Unit to full strength, and less than would be needed to expand CCHR’s role in the hate violence prevention ecosystem. We defer to CCHR to estimate their staffing needs, however the council should aim for at least a \$3 million dollar increase in FY27, and plan to increase that amount in future as necessary to meet demand.

Finally, we have requested a one-time allocation of \$500,000 to support a pilot program evaluating the efficacy of the **Cure Violence** model to hate crime response. This is a nominal amount that would cover program design, program staff costs, consultants, and other needs. This figure can be further refined through an RFP process, consultation with Violence Interruption providers, and additional research.

CONCLUSION

Hate violence presents a complex challenge that cannot be solved through policing alone. The evidence reviewed in this report suggests that prevention strategies focused on social cohesion, early intervention, and community empowerment offer a promising path forward. By investing in the infrastructure that allows diverse communities to cooperate, communicate, and respond to conflict together, New York City can move toward a more effective and sustainable approach to preventing identity-based violence. The recommendations in this report outline a framework for doing so — one that treats hate violence not simply as a criminal justice problem, but as a public safety and community development challenge requiring coordinated, long-term investment.

¹⁰⁸ <https://www.nycbar.org/reports/support-restoration-of-city-funding-and-staff-to-city-commission-on-human-rights-and-equal-employment-practices-commission/>

¹⁰⁹ <https://council.nyc.gov/budget/wp-content/uploads/sites/54/2025/05/Commission-on-Civil-and-Human-Rights.pdf>



JEWS FOR RACIAL & ECONOMIC JUSTICE

Jews For Racial & Economic Justice is the home for Jewish New Yorkers organizing with our neighbors and allies to transform New York from a playground for the wealthy few into a real democracy (with playgrounds for all of us!) For over 30 years, JFREJ members have worked to make the city we love a more caring place, free from all forms of racist and economic violence, where everyone has the opportunity and resources they need to thrive. A grassroots organization with over 6,000 members and a powerful electoral arm, JFREJ is the home of the New York Jewish Left.


SUGGESTED ORGANIZATION

This organizational model centers the Office for the Prevention of Hate Crimes (OPHC) as the coordinating hub of a citywide prevention and response infrastructure. OPHC sits within the Mayor's Office framework and works laterally with other City agencies, bearing responsibility for the overall success of the system. Its role is not primarily direct service delivery, but strategic leadership, grant administration, coordination, and data integration. (We are agnostic as to whether OPHC continues to reside within MOCJ or moves to a Department of Community Safety.)


Under OPHC are five core functional areas in addition to other ongoing work. First, public communications: OPHC collaborates with the Commission on Human Rights (CCHR) and the Department of Cultural Affairs (DCLA) to develop and place PSAs aligned with program strategy. Second, strategy and evaluation: OPHC and community-based organizations (CBOs) jointly set priorities, establish metrics, and adjust programming as needed. Third, grant administration: OPHC manages both a primary peer-informed grantmaking process, in which CBOs help evaluate applications, and a secondary stream of additional grants or fee-for-service contracts. Fourth, professional development: OPHC supports field capacity through training, learning exchanges, and best-practice development. Fifth, incident tracking and data coordination: OPHC receives reports from NYPD, CBOs, and other agencies, integrates and publishes data, and coordinates responses as needed.

Parallel to prevention programming is a crisis-response track. Incident reporting flows through NYPD, CCHR and CBO hotlines, and may connect to a real-time assistance hotline administered by an agency or CBO. Victim services are delivered through entities such as NYS OVS, Safe Horizon, Family Justice Centers, District Attorneys, and CCHR.

At the community level, regional program managers and CBOs implement programming—such as Intergroup Communal Project, de-escalation trainings, rapid response, education, hotlines, and accompaniment—directly serving New Yorkers. The overall structure is a hub-and-spoke model combining centralized strategy and data coordination with decentralized, community-based implementation. In most cases, the plan assumes that program managers will be housed at relevant local CBOs. However in some cases there may be no appropriate CBO in a neighborhood to hold this work. In these cases the program manager could be housed at a citywide non-profit, or even within a councilmember's district office. In addition, some program managers need not be geographically based. For example, it could make sense to have a citywide program managers for the LGBTQ community or for immigrants, etc.



A PEOPLE-CENTRIC NETWORK OF SERVICES AND PROGRAMMING



HOW DO NEW YORKERS
CONNECT WITH SERVICES AND
PROGRAMMING?

REINVENTING REPORTING: DATA-DRIVEN PREVENTION

- CBO-based reporting lines connect survivors to CBOs, victim services, and city services
- Survey collection connects New Yorkers to CBOs, Intergroup Collaborative Projects, anti-bias & diversity education, de-escalation training

PROACTIVE PREVENTION

- Intergroup Collaborative Projects connect New Yorkers to CBOs, city agencies & programs, anti-bias & diversity education, de-escalation training
- Field Program connects New Yorkers to CBOs, Intergroup Collaborative Projects
- De-escalation Trainings connect New Yorkers to CBOs, and Intergroup Collaborative Projects, anti-bias & diversity education
- PSA Advertising connects New Yorkers to CBOs, accompaniment programs and city services
- Crisis (Realtime Assistance) Hotline connects New Yorkers to CBOs, accompaniment programs and city services

RAPID INCIDENT RESPONSE

- Rapid Response connects New Yorkers to CBOs, Intergroup Collaborative Projects, accompaniment programs, anti-bias & diversity education, de-escalation training

OTHER

- CBOs connect survivors to social workers, city services, victim services, and CBOs
- City Agencies connect survivors to city services, victim services, and CBOs
- Schools can connect young New Yorkers to CBOs & Intergroup Collaborative Projects
- SYEP should connect young New Yorkers to anti-bias & diversity education, de-escalation training

Program Area	Related to	Calculation	Annual Cost Estimate	Notes
REINVENTING REPORTING: DATA-DRIVEN PREVENTION				
CBO-based 24/7 Reporting Hotlines	<i>"Recommendation: invest in non-police reporting of hate crimes and bias incidents"</i>	Two lines, fully-staffed 24/7/365 including management overhead. This is based on a per line cost of: Direct staffing: \$546,000 (using a relief factor of 5.2 @ \$70,000/year plus fringe benefits (total = \$105,000/year per FTE) Night differential: \$6,000 Overtime cushion: \$55,000 Management allocation: \$75,000 Plus a \$43,000 overage for a per-seat total of \$725,000	\$1,450,000	This will allow two CBOs to run 24/7 hotlines in addition to CM Restler's proposed CCHR-based hotlines.
Neighborhood surveys	<i>"Recommendation: supplement or supplant voluntary reporting and hate crimes data with surveys"</i>	Cost to survey seven neighborhoods based on recent CUNY PSP projects	\$400,000	Estimate based on seven neighborhoods based on recent CUNY PSP projects; it could be more efficient in the long term to create permanent surveying infrastructure with full time positions.
PROACTIVE PREVENTION				
Regional Program Managers	<i>"Recommendation: use collaborative organizing projects to build intergroup relationships; hire regional or community-specific program managers"</i>	\$120k/ year per manager. 51 city council districts. estimated at 1 per district	\$6,120,000	Based on one manager per council district. Costs would come down if districts are consolidated however political support might suffer.
Field Program Funds	<i>"Recommendation: a field program for hate violence prevention"</i>	\$20,000 per org (70 Organizations)	\$1,400,000	Estimated program budget for field operations (not including full time staff and organizational overhead).
Media monitoring	<i>"Recommendation: implement a media surveillance program combined with up-to-date demographic data for predictive mapping of potential identity-based conflict"</i>	Rough estimate	\$300,000	Contract for an ongoing research program at a policy institute or university department.
De-escalation and other trainings and Workshop for Community members	<i>"Recommendation: scale and set ambitious metrics for upstander intervention training"</i>	70 orgs averaging 38 workshops each annually with average cost of \$3000 plus overage \$220k for 45 pieces at one subway site. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/02/arts/design/public-art-covid-race-subway.html 500 subway in-car cards: 500 × (\$75–\$150) ≈ \$37,500–\$75,000 (plus print/installation) Blue Line Media (https://www.bluelinemedia.com/train-rail-advertising) \$57k for 500 cards x 4 weeks at median price; \$228k for 500 cards @ 16 weeks/year 50 bus shelters: 50 × (\$1,300–\$6,500) ≈ \$65,000–\$325,000 (https://www.bluelinemedia.com/bus-advertising/new-york-city-ny) \$455,000 for 100 shelters x 4 weeks at median price; \$1,365,000 for 100 shelters for 12 weeks + \$30k overhead	\$8,100,000	Based on CAE break even costs and capacity needs estimation; At 25 people per workshop that's 2700 workshops training 67,500 New Yorkers trained per year. For context, total engagement across all programs for all OPHC grantees was 12,532 in 2025.
Media & advertising	<i>"Recommendation: budget for more (and more responsive) PSA advertising; shift the content of HV prevention messaging"</i>		\$1,623,000	Impressions can be in the millions for a single campaign.
Realtime Crisis Assistance Hotline	<i>"Recommendation: explore a hotline for real-time support in moments of crisis"</i>	Two lines, plus one supervisor and one social worker, fully-staffed 24/7/365 including management overhead. This is based on a per line cost of: Direct staffing: \$546,000 (using a relief factor of 5.2 @ \$70,000/year plus fringe benefits (total = \$105,000/year per FTE) Night differential: \$6,000 Overtime cushion: \$55,000 Management allocation: \$75,000 Plus a \$43,000 overage for a per-seat total of \$725,000	\$2,900,000	This should provide adequate capacity to pilot a program given an upper bound of 400–900 incident/year
Accompaniment Program	<i>"Recommendation: explore accompaniment programs as an ongoing citywide service"</i>	12 organization supported pilot programs, 1 program manager/evaluator (120k), one dedicated staff member for each program (120k), volunteer support, materials, stipends (15k per program for smaller items)	\$1,740,000	
BUILDING THE FIELD				
Professional development	<i>"Recommendation: invest in the professional development of hate prevention leaders"</i>	\$1000 professional development funds set aside per person (70 orgs (5 ppl per org) plus 51 regional managers = 401) Plus \$10k in grants set aside for travel and other professional development expenses.	\$411,000	
Community Forums/Peer Grantmaking	<i>convenings, assemblies</i>	Quarterly gatherings of all orgs (\$20,000 per convening) plus \$60k for a larger annual event	\$140,000	
Language support	<i>"Recommendation: provide more support for materials development, translation, and printing"</i>	Nominal estimate	\$100,000	
ADDITIONAL FUNDING				

Program Area	Related to	Calculation	Annual Cost Estimate	Notes
Education on diversity & anti-bias	<i>"Recommendation: increase funding and support for the development of diversity education and anti-bias curricula"</i>	Curriculum development approx 35k each for 10 new curricula + 75k for specialized needs	\$425,000	
Social worker pool	<i>Recommendation: Create a social worker pool for smaller CBOs</i>	Based on 3500 workshops, \$250 per workshop (CAE's demand estimate); or seven full time social workers	\$875,000	
Misc. program grants & staffing	Resourcing OPHC <i>Community Project Grants</i> and CBO/local projects not otherwise funded here	This covers 20 full time positions @ \$120k/year at CBOs plus OPHC's Community Grants Program	\$3,400,000	
		Subtotal Total	\$27,934,000.00	
One Time Costs				
Research	<i>"Recommendation: to prevent retaliatory violence, support research into the applicability of CURE Violence, etc. to bias crimes"</i>	One time cost for pilot study	\$500,000	
Primary Programming		Total	\$28,434,000.00	
ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS				
Expand self-defense training (via Malikah)		\$3 million for school-based safety education programs \$2 million for community and faith-based safety trainings \$1.5 million for joint Islamophobia and antisemitism prevention initiatives \$1 million for targeted outreach and leadership programs for Muslim women and girls \$500,000 for curriculum development, coordination, and program evaluation	\$8,000,000	A \$8 million annual investment would allow New York City to scale these prevention strategies citywide. Investing in self-defense education would expand New York City's capacity to prevent hate violence through culturally competent, community-led interventions that empower those most directly impacted to build collective safety.
Does not include OPHC & CCHR staffing, Safe Horizon, SYEP or other agency funding; it also excludes capital budget public safety improvements such as street lighting, etc.				

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